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Authors(s)	McGrath, Charles Ivar
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Securing the Hanoverian Succession in Ireland: Jacobites, Money and Men, 1714–16

This article examines the connection between issues of security, finance and the army in Ireland in the years 1714–16. The death of Queen Anne and succession of the first Hanoverian monarch, George I, in August 1714, offered renewed hope to the supporters of the Jacobite cause in Ireland, Scotland, England and beyond. However, the threat of a Stuart restoration by force of arms served to galvanise the efforts of government in both England and Ireland in support of the Hanoverian succession, though the necessary military preparations and precautions resulted in increased public expenditure. In Ireland, the government's need to find new sources of revenue meant that parliament would have to be convened, which, in turn, necessitated compliance with a series of constitutional practices which had evolved since the 1690s in relation to Poyning's Law and supply legislation. Yet despite a threatened Jacobite invasion, factional political manoeuvring, as ever, demanded compromise, though ultimately the wholly protestant Irish parliament took the necessary precautions to secure Ireland for the new Hanoverian regime by voting new taxes and facilitating the creation of a national debt in order to raise new regiments for the army. The coalescing of the issues of security, finance and the army thereby led to new innovations in Irish parliamentary and financial practice which were to become key components of the constitutional framework in Ireland until legislative independence in 1782.

Keywords: money; national debt; Supply Bills; law; parliament; politics; army; protestant; catholic

As David Hayton has amply demonstrated in a series of groundbreaking publications since the 1970s, the Irish parliament embarked on a new and vibrant phase of its history in the aftermath of the Glorious Revolution. The advent of regular parliamentary sessions from 1692 onwards resulted in the Irish assembly becoming a much more vital institution of state than had previously been the case. Irish MPs thereby became more centrally involved in the running of the country, leading politicians found themselves having more day-to-day influence within government, and political, economic and other grievances could be more readily addressed at a national level. At the heart of such changes was a number of interconnected factors: security, finance, and the army – or Jacobites, money and men.¹

In 1695, a political compromise was reached between government and parliament over the issue of financial supply legislation, which gave the Irish house of commons control over the raising of the majority of the additional income required by government to pay for a permanent and enlarged army in Ireland. The Commons

¹ For a selection of relevant publications, see D.W. Hayton, *Ruling Ireland, 1685–1742: Politics, Politicians and Parties* (Woodbridge, 2004); D.W. Hayton, 'Introduction: The Long Apprenticeship', *Parliamentary History*, xx (2001), 1–26; D.W. Hayton, 'Ideas of Union in Anglo-Irish Political discourse, 1692–1720: Meaning and Use', in *Political Discourse in Seventeenth- and Eighteenth-Century Ireland*, ed. David George Boyce, Robert Eccleshall and Vincent Geoghegan (Basingstoke, 2001), 142–68; D.W. Hayton, 'A Debate in the Irish House of Commons in 1703: A Whiff of Tory Grapeshot', *Parliamentary History*, x (1991), 151–63; D.W. Hayton, 'Divisions in the Whig Junto in 1709: Some Irish Evidence', *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research*, lv (1982), 213–21; D.W. Hayton, 'An Irish Parliamentary Diary from the Reign of Queen Anne', *Analecta Hibernica*, xxx (1982), 97–149.

ensured, thereafter, that parliamentary supplies were only voted for defined periods of time, thereby ensuring regular sessions throughout the 18th century. The acceptance of, and financial provision for, a permanent and enlarged army in Ireland was, at first, primarily motivated by security concerns: the Irish protestant ruling minority elite feared a renewed Irish Roman catholic rebellion and Franco-Jacobite invasion and a large army offered security against that threat, whether real or perceived. But once England's war with France ended in 1697, Ireland began to serve a different purpose in a wider imperial strategy, as the location of the largest single part of Britain's peacetime standing army. The presence, however, of James II and, following his death in 1701, of the Stuart pretender on the Continent ensured that the threat of an attempted Jacobite restoration continued to focus the minds of Irish protestants at key moments in the decades following the Glorious Revolution.²

At one time or another between 1692 and 1714, one or more of the three interconnected issues of security, finance and the army was the dominant factor when the Irish parliament met. However, the death of Queen Anne in August 1714 and the succession of the first Hanoverian monarch, George I, brought all three elements into play in relation to the Irish executive and legislature, as the governments in both Britain and Ireland looked to secure the new regime in the face of testing financial, security and military challenges. At the same time, even in dealing with those challenges, the Irish government and parliament demonstrated that the constitutional

² See, in general, C.I. McGrath, *Ireland and Empire, 1692–1770* (2012), *passim*; C.I. McGrath, *The Making of the Eighteenth-Century Irish Constitution: Government Parliament and the Revenue, 1692–1714* (Dublin, 2000), *passim*. For a recent account of Irish Protestant fears of the French in this period see James Kelly, ‘“Disappointing the Boundless Ambitions of France”: Irish Protestants and the Fear of Invasion, 1661–1815’, *Studia Hibernica*, xxxvii (2011), 39–46.

framework which had evolved since the 1690s had to be adhered to, though all were willing to allow necessity to be both the mother of innovation and of compromise.

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Official news of the death of Queen Anne on 1 August 1714 and the succession of George I reached Ireland in just over a week. On 9 August, the under secretary, Joshua Dawson, recorded that an 'express' mail had 'brought us the melancholy account of her late majesty's death'. On receipt of the news, the Irish government 'immediately proclaimed the king and issued proclamations for proclaiming his majesty in all the cities and towns of Ireland'. They also took the precaution of issuing 'another proclamation for seizing all the horses and [arms] of the papists, and we have no apprehensions of any disturbance or trouble in this country, and if there be any at all, it must arise I fancy in Scotland'.³ The Irish government's decision to issue a proclamation for disarming Roman Catholics, a policy which had been enshrined in law in 1695, was a manifestation of their anxiety lest there should be a Jacobite attempt to overthrow the Hanoverian succession in favour of the Stuart pretender.

Events in both Ireland and England in the following months demonstrated the implications of the establishment of the Hanoverian succession. In mid-September, the sitting Tory lords justices, Lord Chancellor Sir Constantine Phipps and Thomas Lindsey, archbishop of Armagh, were replaced by the more acceptably Whiggish archbishop of Dublin, William King, and Robert Fitzgerald, earl of Kildare, which

³ TNA, SP63/371/23: J[oshua] Dawson to [Sir Charles Delafaye], 9 Aug. 1714; S.J. Connolly, *Religion, Law and Power: The Making of Protestant Ireland 1660–1760* (Oxford, 1992), 1.

heralded the commencement of a policy of removing tories from government.⁴ Coinciding with the change of lords justices was the appointment of a new lord lieutenant, in the person of Charles Spencer, earl of Sunderland.⁵ The privy council was dissolved shortly afterwards and a new one formed in which the recently dominant tories were replaced with whigs.⁶ The senior judicial offices were also given to whigs; Alan Brodrick became lord chancellor and William Whitshed, John Forster and Joseph Deane were made chief judges of the other three courts. Further changes to the puisne judges were made in the following months.⁷

Security concerns dominated the thinking of the new government in the early months of the Hanoverian succession. One of the first actions of the new lords justices was to respond to orders from London for half-pay officers from three recently-disbanded regiments to be transported from Ireland to Scotland in order to secure that region from an attempted Stuart restoration.⁸ As for Ireland, even prior to the death of Queen Anne, the government's effort to combat the enlistment of Irishmen for the pretender's service had been intensifying,⁹ while the first months of George I's reign witnessed the Irish commissioners of Oyer and Terminer finding 21 people guilty of that offence. In December, the lords justices advised that, if the king saw fit to pardon the lives of any of the 21, it would be of 'ill consequence to turn them loose to infest

⁴ BL, Add. MS 61635, ff. 131–3. On the government changes in Ireland in general, see Patrick McNally, *Parties, Patriots and Undertakers: Parliamentary Politics in Early Hanoverian Ireland* (Dublin, 1997), 67–78.

⁵ TNA, PC2/85, 82–5; SP63/371/30.

⁶ BL, Add. MS 61636, ff. 99–100, 101–2, 104.

⁷ BL, Add. MS 61635, ff. 47, 81.

⁸ BL, Add. MS 61635, ff. 33, 41; McGrath, *Ireland and Empire*, 155.

⁹ TNA, SP63/370/30, 70, 240, 242–4.

this country, in which there are so many in the Pretender's interest'. Better, therefore, that they should be 'transported to some of the foreign plantations' for 'examples sake and the common safety'. In early 1715, all 21 were sent to the West Indies, at which time a further 20 were awaiting trial for the same offence.¹⁰

In light of such events, it was not overly surprising that Archbishop King was much agitated by the perceived Jacobite threat and the adherence of Irish Catholics to the Stuart cause. At the end of December 1714, he advised Sunderland of the increased lawlessness in the north of Ireland; he attributed this to 'the great encouragement the papists lately had ... of the Pretender's coming', which had 'given them new spirit, and [their now] being disappointed they are madder and desperate, and venture on these extravagancies'.¹¹

Yet in reality, the most pressing issue for government in both London and Dublin was the public finances. The political impasse that had arisen between the Whigs and Tories in the Irish parliament of 1713 had resulted in the essential additional parliamentary duties being voted for only three months to 25 March 1714. A twofold problem ensued when they lapsed: first, the Irish government's income decreased by about one-quarter per annum, resulting thereby in an increase in pay arrears, especially for the army; and second, the actual amount of lost income increased exponentially over the ensuing months, as merchants stockpiled goods while the hiatus in the imposition of the additional duties continued. In November 1714, the lords justices explained that merchants had imported 'a vast quantity of tobacco as soon as the additional duty on that commodity expired'. Although that importation

¹⁰ BL, Add. MS 61635, ff. 83, 109–10: lords justices to lord lieutenant, 5 Dec. 1714, 18 Jan. 1715; see also BL, Add. MS 61635, ff. 85–8.

¹¹ BL, Add. MS 61635, f. 153: Archbishop King to Sunderland, 31 Dec. 1714.

had ‘very much increased the revenue of this year’, because of the augmented return from the permanent hereditary duty payable on tobacco, it meant inevitably that there would be a ‘much greater drawback’ the following year because, at a ‘modest computation, ... this kingdom is at present sufficiently stocked with tobacco for a year and a half’. Even when the additional duties were restored, the loss of revenue would continue, owing to the greatly-reduced need to import more tobacco until the stockpiles were used up.¹² While there seemed little chance that anything could be done to call parliament in Ireland before the pending crop of tobacco was imported to Ireland, Archbishop King entertained hopes that ‘we may have one before the great quantity of wine from the last vintage be brought in, which will be in March or April [1715]’.¹³

But even with such pressing financial concerns, the process of convening parliament was long drawn out. The politics of party in Ireland, even with the tories in retreat, required management, while the interpretation of the 1695 compromise, and its ensuing evolution, required clarification on both sides of the Irish Sea.¹⁴ The traditional desire to avoid having both the Westminster and Dublin parliaments sitting at the same time was also invoked as a reason for delaying the latter assembly.¹⁵ The question of who would oversee parliament as chief governor would also become an issue at a later stage in the proceedings.

As had been the case in the lead-up to the election of new parliaments in Ireland in 1703 and 1711, much energy was expended on identifying potential

¹² BL, Add. MS 61635, f. 69: lords justices to lord lieutenant, 17 Nov. 1714.

¹³ BL, Add. MS 61635, ff. 147–9: Archbishop King to [Sunderland], 21 Nov. 1714; see also Add. MS 61635, f. 188.

¹⁴ McGrath, *Irish Constitution*, 118–290.

¹⁵ BL, Add. MS 61635, f. 162.

candidates for Speaker of the Commons. The Speaker had significant influence with the lower House and so the candidates were a matter of great interest for the government and the political community at large. As early as October 1714, the matter was under active discussion. Lord Chancellor Brodrick, who had done much to make the speakership independent of government when he held the position between 1703 and 1709, and again in 1713–14,¹⁶ initially recommended George Gore, the incoming attorney general, but he declined on health grounds. Of the other mooted candidates, Brodrick was firmly opposed to Sir Richard Levinge, who had the dubious honour of being the successful government nominee in the ‘Sole Right’ parliament of 1692 and the unsuccessful government nominee in 1713 when Brodrick had prevailed on an opposition platform. Levinge’s long-standing flirtations with the tory party also did not stand him in good stead. The best alternative was the assuredly whig William Conolly, with whom Brodrick had been allied throughout Anne’s reign. However, even Brodrick’s conditional support for Conolly pointed to the future fallout between the two men – a fallout that anticipated the factionalism that characterised Irish whigs once they no longer felt the need to maintain a united front because the tory party had gone into irrevocable decline.¹⁷

The question of a parliamentary supply, and the origins and content of the Supply Bills, was central to the convening of parliament in Ireland. As was the norm from 1695, the government began preparing financial accounts in January 1715 to

¹⁶ C.I. McGrath, ‘Alan Brodrick and the Speakership of the Irish House of Commons, 1703–4’, in *People, Politics and Power: Essays on Irish History 1660–1850 in Honour of James I. McGuire*, ed. James Kelly, John McCafferty and C.I. McGrath (Dublin, 2009), 70–93.

¹⁷ BL, Add. MS 61636, ff. 113–14, 115–16, 119–22: Brodrick to [Sunderland], [19], 26 Oct., 16 Nov., 27 Dec. 1714; Hayton, *Ruling Ireland*, 217–36; Patrick Walsh, *The Making of the Irish Protestant Ascendancy: The Life of William Conolly, 1662–1729* (Woodbridge, 2010), 101, 154–63, 168.

facilitate the Commons' assessment of the quantum of supply to be voted and the ways and means of raising that supply.¹⁸ At the same time, discussions between London and Dublin turned to the delicate matter of the government's token Supply Bill which, in keeping with the 1695 compromise, was introduced at the beginning of a new parliament in keeping with Poyning's Law and the crown's prerogative right to initiate legislation. Sunderland transmitted to Ireland the opinion of the king and privy council in London that 'a bill for the additional duties should be one of those transmitted under the Great Seal at the opening of the parliament', which, Alan Brodrick mused, 'shows that to be a thing resolved on and determined, so that it no way becomes us to consider or debate that point'. Yet, true to form, he still tried to do so.¹⁹

The English government's aspiration to include a 'retrospect for charging stock in hand' in the government bill gave Brodrick his opportunity.²⁰ Brodrick, Conolly, Whitshed and Deane met on several occasions to discuss the matter and, having agreed an opinion, Brodrick was tasked with responding to London.²¹ In a lengthy letter, he informed Sunderland that the proposed retrospect was a matter of 'great weight and difficulty'. Having enumerated the practical difficulties of trying to tax goods retrospectively, he counselled that it was the unanimous opinion of the leading whigs that 'if a money bill must be sent over, it should be the same bill as formerly for granting the additional duties for three or [four] months, without any clause of retrospect'. Because of the 1695 compromise, the Commons 'had the

¹⁸ BL, Add. MS 61636, ff. 203–4, 216–19.

¹⁹ BL, Add. MS 61636, f. 125: Brodrick to [Sunderland], 7 Jan. 1715.

²⁰ BL, Add. MS 61636, f. 199: Conolly to [Sunderland], 4 Jan. 1715.

²¹ BL, Add. MS 61636, ff. 123, 201–2.

experience of' that bill and, therefore, 'will not be surprised at it as a new thing'. However, the introduction of an innovation such as the retrospect, especially in a bill to be 'transmitted from England', could not 'be more distasteful to the House [of Commons]'. Moreover, there was 'no reason to doubt that good and effectual funds will be found out for raising such sums as the parliament shall see necessary to give: A deficient fund was never given here in the memory of any man living. Why then may not the manner be left to the House?' Saving his most obtuse argument for last, he concluded by suggesting that London should drop the idea of transmitting a token Supply Bill at all, on the convoluted grounds that the proposal for a retrospective clause had so muddied the waters that it was best to leave the raising of the whole supply to the Commons. However, this argument served mainly to demonstrate Brodrick's continuing commitment, more than 20 years after the 'sole right' crisis of 1692–3, to put an end to government Supply Bills by whatever means possible.²²

The focus of attention upon a successful parliamentary supply and maximising the income arose from the need to find more money for the pay of the army in Ireland. The end of the War of the Spanish Succession in 1713 had resulted in the demobilisation of most of the British army, with Ireland fulfilling its role as the location for the single largest part of the much-reduced army that remained. The increased public expenditure arose from the need to pay the returning soldiers, which brought the military establishment back up to its required peacetime level of 12,000 men, and the building of new barracks.²³ In January 1715, Conolly reassured Sunderland that 'it cannot be disagreeable to the parliament of Ireland to have the

²² BL, Add. MS 61636, ff. 125–6: Brodrick to [Sunderland], 7 Jan. 1715; see also Add. MS 61636, ff. 127, 131–2.

²³ McGrath, *Ireland and Empire*, 69, 75–92, 107–9, 123–32.

[military] establishment made up [to] 12,000 strong', but commented that it would be difficult to get a sufficient supply from parliament to cover the army's full pay, though, he observed reassuringly, this, too, 'will be done and I hope with satisfaction'. The removal of 'some of the unnecessary pensions on the establishment', which was a favourite grievance among Irish MPs, would help to pave the way, though a suggestion that the army in Ireland might be increased to 15,000 men was deemed a dangerous proposition, not least because there were already rumours of an impending land tax, 'which makes people uneasy'. Conolly counselled prudently that it would be unwise to add to that disquiet by increasing the size and cost of the army.²⁴

For his part, Brodrick claimed that the 12,000 men would be supported financially only if 'they remain in Ireland while they are paid by it', thereby voicing the known concern of Irish MPs at the exportation of Irish money to pay soldiers serving overseas.²⁵ More disingenuously, he also warned that the opinions being offered from Ireland as to how parliament might act should not be made public because 'the persons advised with are branded with the name of undertakers'.²⁶ Brodrick's continuing fear that he should be perceived by his fellow MPs as managing parliament for the government, 20 years after he had first been described as a parliamentary 'undertaker',²⁷ rang rather hollow, given that he had been a prime

²⁴ BL, Add. MS 61636, ff. 214–15: Conolly to [Sunderland], 25 Jan. 1715; see also Add. MS 61636, f. 216.

²⁵ BL, Add. MS 61636, ff. 131–2: Brodrick to [Sunderland], 25 Jan. 1715; McGrath, *Ireland and Empire*, 144–5, 151–5, 157–66.

²⁶ BL, Add. MS 61636, ff. 131–2: Brodrick to [Sunderland], 25 Jan. 1715.

²⁷ HMC, *Downshire MSS*, i, 492–3; C.I. McGrath, 'English Ministers, Irish Politicians and the Making of a Parliamentary Settlement in Ireland, 1692–5', *English Historical Review*, cxix (2004), 611.

mover in the development of this ‘Undertaker System’ over the preceding two decades.²⁸

In terms of actual revenue raised, the government Supply Bill was merely a token offering which possessed more political and constitutional significance than financial reward. The key revenue measures were to be included in the heads of bills that took their rise in the Commons. On this point, Conolly made it clear that ‘the parliament will be very unwilling to come into any other, than the additional duties formerly granted, for they [will] think it hard to go into new funds in time of peace, when the old ones answered in the time of war’.²⁹ He acknowledged that this would result in a reduced income in the first year, owing to the prior stockpiling of goods, but argued that any such ‘arrear ... will be cleared off in a year or two more, and at worst it will be but postponing some parts of the civil and military list, for the parliament here will not come into any clause for [borrowing] money, as is usual there [in England]’.³⁰ With less scruples on the matter of managing parliament than Brodrick feigned, Conolly assured Sunderland ‘that care will be taken, that such funds as will be given will effectually answer and produce the sums for which they shall be given’.³¹ To that end, he did not doubt but that ‘the parliament will cheerfully and effectually supply the occasions of the government and pay the army they always

²⁸ For the development of the ‘Undertaker System’, see D.W. Hayton, ‘The Beginnings of the “Undertaker System”’, in *Penal Era and Golden Age: Essays in Irish History, 1690–1800*, ed. Thomas Bartlett and D.W. Hayton (Belfast, 1979), 32–54; Hayton, *Ruling Ireland*, 106–30.

²⁹ BL, Add. MS 61636, f. 215: Conolly to [Sunderland], 25 Jan. 1715.

³⁰ BL, Add. MS 61636, f. 228: Conolly to [Sunderland], 15 Feb. 1715. In this latter respect, Conolly would be proved wrong, as the security situation changed dramatically for the worse as 1715 unfolded.

³¹ BL, Add. MS 61636, ff. 230–1: Conolly to [Sunderland], 5 Mar. 1715.

desired'.³² Brodrick also avowed there was 'no question but that the parliament will give supplies sufficient to defray the expense of his majesty's Establishment', but warned that 'nobody can foresee the manner of doing it'. He simply claimed that 'parliament here never yet gave a fund which did not answer more than it was given for', and that there was no reason to think the approaching parliament would not 'show as much loyalty to his majesty and readiness to support his Establishment'.³³

In the early summer of 1715, the focus shifted from finance to security as fresh rumours circulated of an intended Jacobite invasion and rebellion prompted by an outbreak of rioting in parts of England.³⁴ In Ireland, although the government was initially 'not ... extremely apprehensive of an invasion', they still deemed it prudent to take appropriate precautions, including an assessment of the stores of weapons and the condition of the garrisons.³⁵ By late July, attitudes had changed somewhat, as the 'report of the Pretender's preparations [to invade], must sufficiently alarm a country in which besides non-jurors, Jacobites &c. there are at least six papists to one protestant'.³⁶ As a result, proclamations were issued requiring magistrates to ensure 'that the oaths be tendered to all papists and other suspected persons, [and] that they do search for and seize upon all such arms, armour, ammunition and serviceable horses as they shall find in the custody of, or belonging to, papists or non-jurors'. Accounts of all 'arms, ammunition and warlike stores' in the various localities were to be sent to the privy council, as were 'the names of all inmates, lodgers and strangers'

³² BL, Add. MS 61636, f. 232: Conolly to [Sunderland], 15 Mar. 1715; see also Add. MS 61636, ff. 235–6.

³³ BL, Add. MS 61636, ff. 143–4: Brodrick to [Sunderland], 19 Mar. 1714/[15].

³⁴ TNA, PC2/85, 250–7, 260–6.

³⁵ BL, Add. MS 61636, f. 189: Eustace Budgell to [Addison], 9 July 1715.

³⁶ BL, Add. MS 61636, f. 191: Budgell to Addison, 28 July 1715.

in Dublin and elsewhere.³⁷ Reports were also transmitted to London dealing with individuals convicted of being ‘the Pretender’s men’.³⁸

The need to establish the state of the stores of arms arose because orders were issued at the same time for the militia to array.³⁹ Unlike in England, the government was required to supply the militia with arms, hence their concern at the shortage of weapons in public storage.⁴⁰ By the end of July, the government had sent additional troops to the key locations of Galway, Limerick, Cork and Kinsale.⁴¹ The coinciding receipt of instructions from London to send three regiments from Ireland to Scotland prompted the lords justices to request of Sunderland ‘that[,] since the papists in this country are so vastly superior to the protestants and are at all times ready to rise upon us if an occasion offers, we may not be left naked and defenceless by the withdrawing any more of our troops’.⁴² Despite such protests, a month later a further three regiments were ordered to England.⁴³

The evolving security crisis had a palpable effect on political thinking regarding parliament in Ireland. At the end of August, pursuant to a request that Sunderland send them as large a quantity of arms and ammunition as he could procure from the English Ordnance Office, the lords justices stated confidently that payment

³⁷ BL, Add. MS 61636, ff. 193: order in council, 28 July 1715; TNA, SP63/373/58–9.

³⁸ TNA, SP63/373/7–8: lords justices to Sunderland, 30 July 1715; see also SP63/373/21, 30–1, 32–3, 37–42.

³⁹ BL, Add. MS 61635, f. 123.

⁴⁰ TNA, SP63/373/90–1; Neal Garnham, *The Militia in Eighteenth-Century Ireland: In Defence of the Protestant Interest* (Woodbridge, 2012), 24–5.

⁴¹ BL, Add. MS 61635, f. 125.

⁴² BL, Add. MS 61635, f. 123: lords justices to lord lieutenant, 28 July 1715.

⁴³ BL, Add. MS 61635, f. 128.

could be made from the Irish revenue at large because ‘we can venture to assure your excellency that an Irish parliament, whenever it meets, will very readily make good any sum laid out for the defence of the nation at this time’.⁴⁴ Brodrick and Conolly’s earlier arguments that it would be difficult to convince the Irish parliament to vote increased additional duties in peacetime carried little weight now that the country was in the grip of crisis.

At the same time, Sunderland’s decision to stay in London as lord privy seal, rather than accept a posting to Ireland, created a new degree of uncertainty in late summer 1715, which was exacerbated by the resulting decision in London to replace him with a commission of lords justices.⁴⁵ Brodrick articulated genuine concern at the prospect of convening parliament under the governance of lords justices, on the grounds that a party already seemed to be emerging in Ireland that was ‘dissatisfied at the present administration’ and would aim to render ‘the approaching session of parliament uneasy’.⁴⁶ Conolly was more circumspect when, in confiding his disappointment to Sunderland that he was not coming to Ireland, he stated that ‘the great character’ the outgoing lord lieutenant had given of Charles Fitzroy, duke of Grafton, one of the two incoming lords justices, would entitle Grafton ‘to all the assistance your lordship’s true friends can contribute to make his administration easy’. As for the second justice, Henri de Massue de Ruvigny, earl of Galway, Conolly acknowledged that ‘he is well acquainted in this kingdom though things are much changed and upon another footing since he was in the government here’. This

⁴⁴ TNA, SP63/373/90–1: lords justices to Sunderland, 25 Aug. 1715.

⁴⁵ TNA, PC2/85, 283–4; McNally, *Parties, Patriots and Undertakers*, 47.

⁴⁶ BL, Add. MS 61636, ff. 154–5: Brodrick to [?], [Sept. 1715].

reservation notwithstanding, Conolly still hoped all would be carried on with success.⁴⁷

In reality, Galway had been appointed because he had successfully overseen parliament in Ireland in 1697–9, when he had served as a lords justice with Charles Powlett, marquis of Winchester. Indeed, it had been the first occasion since 1661–2 that a commission of lords justices were given the responsibility, and it diminished the validity of Brodrick’s claims in that respect. Galway had been appointed in 1697 as the senior figure in the commission responsible for educating and guiding the young Winchester in the art of the chief governor’s office. In 1715, Galway was reappointed to do the same thing with the young Grafton. The usefulness of such an arrangement was seen in that fact that both Bolton (as Winchester had become) and Grafton went on to serve as lord lieutenants after 1716, though neither learned their lessons well from the more talented Galway, who could never hold the chief governor’s office on his own because of his French nationality, despite his naturalisation as an English subject.⁴⁸

The alterations in the chief governor’s office coincided with the receipt in London of three proposed bills drafted by the Irish government as the first step in the process required by the terms of Poyning’s Law to provide cause and consideration for convening parliament. The bills were for recognizing George I’s title to the throne of Great Britain, France, and Ireland; for preventing Irish men from enlisting in foreign service; and the token government Supply Bill for granting, for six months, an

⁴⁷ TNA, SP63/373/142–3: Conolly to [Sunderland], 12 Sept. 1715.

⁴⁸ Hayton, *Ruling Ireland*, 63, 215; C.I. McGrath, ‘Late Seventeenth- and Early Eighteenth-Century Governance and the Viceroyalty’, in *The Irish Lord Lieutenancy, c. 1541–1922*, ed. Peter Gray and Olwen Purdue (Dublin, 2012), 52–5, 58–9; Marie Léoutre, ‘Life of a Huguenot Exile: Henri de Ruvigny, Earl of Galway, 1648–1720’, University College Dublin PhD, 2012, pp. 97–100, 282–5.

additional duty on beer, ale, strong waters, tobacco, and other goods and merchandises.⁴⁹ On 14 September, the committee of the British privy council appointed to consider the bills, judged that the prohibition on foreign service was unnecessary, ‘there being an act passed in Great Britain’ during Anne’s reign ‘in which Ireland is named: and therefore an exemplification of the said act under the great seal of Great Britain ... will be sufficient’ if sent to Ireland. That for recognizing the king’s title to the throne was agreed without amendment, ‘although their lordships do not think the same necessary; but only as it may be convenient there should be one bill for the House of Lords in Ireland to open the session with’. As for the Supply Bill, it was simply recommended that the start date be changed from 1 to 21 November. The committee also recommended that ‘a commission to the lords justices now executing the said government’ be sent to Ireland ‘to cause writs to be issued in the usual manner ... as soon as may be convenient’.⁵⁰ The following day, the king and privy council agreed to all the recommendations and ordered the two bills back to Ireland with a commission for Galway and Grafton or, ‘in their absence’, given that both men were still in London, ‘the persons now executing the office of lords justices’, to convene parliament.⁵¹

The procedure followed in the first half of September in both Dublin and London was consistent with Poyning’s Law and the 1695 compromise. The alteration to the start date of the Supply Bill was simply intended to allow more time for parliament to convene and go through the various preparatory stages of the supply

⁴⁹ TNA, PC2/85, 279–80; James Kelly, *Poyning’s Law and the Making of Law in Ireland, 1660–1800* (Dublin, 2007), 190–1.

⁵⁰ TNA, PC2/85, 282–3: privy council minutes, 14 Sept. 1715; Kelly, *Poyning’s Law*, 191.

⁵¹ TNA, PC2/85, 283–4: privy council minutes, 15 Sept. 1715.

process, as it had evolved since 1695, before the House actually turned its attention to the receipt of the token government bill. By 1713, the Commons had developed a procedure whereby the government bill was not presented to the House until after the Commons had taken the government's opening speech into consideration, passed a preliminary motion for a supply, convened the committee of the whole House on supply, agreed with that committee's resolution that a supply be granted, and appointed the all-important select committee of public accounts. In the 1713 parliament, it was actually argued that the process had evolved further since 1705 and that the Supply Bill should not be presented until after the public accounts committee had reported. It made sense that all Supply Bills would be better scrutinised when the Commons knew how much money the government needed, which was only made clear in the accounts committee report.⁵²

It was therefore the case that sufficient time had to be made available for that parliamentary process to take place in advance of the presentation of the government Supply Bill. However, the actions of the British privy council created a twofold problem in that respect, which the Irish government raised after the two bills arrived back in Ireland on 30 September. The first issue was that, 'according to the forms of parliament here, it is necessary that the first sessions ... should be opened by reading a bill, and no bill can be read that has not been remitted from England, [and] there must be a bill for each house'. Therefore, if the recognition bill was sent to the Commons, there would be no bill for the Lords, because Supply Bills could 'not begin there, nor can the Commons open their session with a money bill'. The solution lay in

⁵² C.I. McGrath, 'Central Aspects of the Eighteenth-Century Constitutional Framework in Ireland: The Government Supply Bill and Biennial Parliamentary Sessions, 1715–82', *Eighteenth-Century Ireland*, xvi (2001), 13–15; McGrath, *Irish Constitution*, 118–290.

another transmission of three bills before parliament convened, but the time consumed in that process now meant that the earliest possible date for convening was 12 November. The delay created the second problem, which related to the start date of the Supply Bill. The Irish government, therefore, sent the bill back to London in order to have the date changed to 1 December, on the grounds that allowing only nine days for the initial stages of the supply process was unwise because it would require MPs 'to break their rules' which 'might put them out of humour and disgust them'.⁵³ Galway added his weight to the argument while *en route* to Ireland, writing to London that 'you know we cannot in Ireland alter one syllable in that bill or any other after it returns from England' and that 'the people there would take it ill to be obliged to pass a money bill in a hurry'.⁵⁴ However, although the three bills were dealt with quickly in London, the start date for the Supply Bill was left unchanged.⁵⁵

While the various Irish bills passed from one country to another, the long apprehended Jacobite rebellion broke out in Scotland.⁵⁶ As a result, a further five regiments were ordered to Scotland and one more to England, bringing the total regimental contribution from Ireland to 12.⁵⁷ Ireland, however, remained 'in perfect peace[;] ... the papists continue very quiet and seem not ... to be in any disposition to give disturbance'. By the beginning of November, the government had issued commissions for a protestant militia of up to 30,000 men, though they had arms for only 15,000 men and an insufficiency of ammunition. Still, it was believed that even

⁵³ TNA, SP63/373/148–9: [Archbishop King] to Stanhope, 7 Oct. 1715; Kelly, *Poynings' Law*, 191. On the second transmission of bills, see TNA, SP63/373/152, 154, 158.

⁵⁴ TNA, SP63/373/189–90: Galway to Stanhope, 21 Oct. 1715; see also TNA, SP63/373/183–4.

⁵⁵ TNA, PC2/85, 293–4.

⁵⁶ TNA, PC2/85, 288–90, 305–8.

⁵⁷ TNA, SP63/373/112, 144, 150, 193; McGrath, *Ireland and Empire*, 155.

with catholics outnumbering protestants by ‘six to one’, the remaining ‘standing troops’ and militia would be sufficient to prevent any unrest, unless the country was ‘invaded from abroad’.⁵⁸ Such security considerations were to have a significant impact upon the proceedings of the Irish parliament when it finally convened.

By the beginning of November, Galway and Grafton were both in Dublin and the final preparations were in place for the assembly of parliament. The elections were deemed to have gone very favourably, with ‘the Tories in most places giving up very [tamely]’.⁵⁹ The main point of concern for the new lords justices was the commencement date for the government Supply Bill.⁶⁰ Security questions also demanded their attention. The lack of arms and ammunition was exacerbated by the fact that even ‘though the country is hitherto quiet, ... there appears a greater spirit among the papists and other disaffected persons’.⁶¹ The fear that Irish catholics might rebel was heightened by the fact that the army was under strength. However, the lords justices were confident that the Irish parliament would provide for any expense necessary for securing the country, as long as they were not obliged to pay for troops stationed outside Ireland.⁶²

Parliament assembled as planned on 12 November. In their opening speech, the lords justices emphasized the security question, noting that, despite the current calm in Ireland, it was still necessary ‘to put yourselves in the best posture of defence’. To that end, they advised that the king had ordered arms for the militia and for ‘an addition to be made to each [regular army] company’ remaining in Ireland,

⁵⁸ TNA, SP63/373/203–4: Archbishop King to Stanhope, 1 Nov. 1715.

⁵⁹ TNA, SP63/373/207: Delafaye to [Pringle], 3 Nov. 1715.

⁶⁰ TNA, SP63/373/205.

⁶¹ TNA, SP63/373/236: Grafton and Galway to Stanhope, 8 Nov. 1715.

⁶² TNA, SP63/373/242–3.

until ‘such time as he can replace those regiments which the necessity of his affairs has obliged him ... to draw from hence, to suppress the rebels in Great Britain, wherein your safety is equally concerned with that of his other subjects’. They then turned their focus to money, adhering to the 1695 compromise by appealing directly to the Commons for supplies and promising delivery of a full state of the public accounts, while again emphasizing the need for parliament to provide sufficient funds ‘to defray such expenses as you may think proper for your own security’.⁶³

In the Commons, where Conolly was elected Speaker unopposed, the first order of business on the first full day of the session on 14 November was, as required, the reading of a government bill, which, as in 1713, was for preventing mischief by fire.⁶⁴ The House then moved immediately to commence the supply process by resolving to take the opening speech into consideration and by ordering addresses of thanks to the lords justices and of loyalty to the king, which, *inter alia*, was to promise that supplies would be granted ‘as shall be necessary to enable his majesty to support his government with honour’.⁶⁵ On 15 November, the Commons addressed security concerns. Its first action was to order heads of bills for attainting the exiled former lord lieutenant, the tory, James Butler, duke of Ormond, of high treason, and for the further security of the king and government and the extinguishing of the hopes of the pretender and his ‘open and secret abettors’. It then resolved that ‘whoever advised the late queen to prorogue’ the Irish parliament in 1714 ‘at a time when a bill to attain the Pretender was under consideration ... was an enemy to the succession in

⁶³ *CJI*, iii, 9–10; TNA, SP63/373/242–3.

⁶⁴ *CJI*, iii, 9; TNA, SP63/373/242–3; McGrath, *Irish Constitution*, 272. The Lords commenced proceedings with the recognition bill.

⁶⁵ *CJI*, iii, 10, 11.

the illustrious house of Hanover, to the protestant interest in this kingdom, and a favourer of the Pretender and popery'. Having thus signalled their desire to seek retribution for the grievances suffered under the tory-led governments of 1711–14, the lower House turned to supply by taking the opening speech into consideration and passing the preliminary motion for supply.⁶⁶

The first committee of the whole House on supply duly convened on 16 November and resolved that a supply be granted to the crown. Immediately thereafter, and well in advance of the Commons' own timetable for the initial stages of the supply process, the government Supply Bill was presented and read for the first time. The following day, it received a second reading and was referred to a committee of the whole House. In the interim, the public accounts were ordered for 18 November, the arrival of which prompted the appointment of the select committee of public accounts. The government Supply Bill then went through the committee of the whole House unhindered and, on 19 November, passed its final reading and was sent to the house of lords for its concurrence.⁶⁷ Despite the government's earlier fears, the bill did not encounter any resistance, even though its start date required the Commons to pass it in precipitate fashion. However, as soon as it had been passed, a tory lawyer, Edward Singleton, endeavoured to raise the 'sole right' question as a means of disrupting affairs, by moving 'a question that for the future the House should not receive any bills of the like kind that first did not take its rise in their House'. He was seconded by 'some young members', while 'several other questions relating to the same' were proposed. However, the debate was put to rest to the government's

⁶⁶ *CJI*, iii, 12. For further evidence of the desire for retribution, see *CJI*, iii, 16, 20, 23–4, 28, 29–30, 32–3, 34–40, 42, 49–50, 60–4, 69–71, 83–5, 100–3, 105–6, 108–11.

⁶⁷ *CJI*, iii, 13–14, 16, 18–20, 22.

satisfaction when ‘it was carried to proceed on the order of the day by 117 against 57’.⁶⁸ The premature presentation of the government Supply Bill was not forgotten, however, as later in the session it was made a standing order of the Commons that, for the future, ‘no money bill be read in this House until the report from the committee of accounts be first made’.⁶⁹

With the government Supply Bill out of the way, attention shifted to the remainder of the necessary money. In accordance with established practice since 1695, the token government bill only provided for the imposition for six months of the main parliamentary additional duties.⁷⁰ The norm established over the preceding two decades was for parliamentary supplies of two years’ duration; therefore, it remained for parliament to vote the existing duties for a further 18 months, and to consider whether the imposition of new duties for two years was required. In keeping with the procedures developed since 1695, the Commons carried out these tasks via their select committee of public accounts, the committees of the whole House on supply and ways and means, and the drafting committees for heads of Supply Bills.⁷¹

The first step in the process involved the committee of public accounts assessing all of the financial documentation laid before the Commons by the government. It was a complex undertaking, involving numerous subcommittees which sat on at least nine occasions before the report was delivered to the House on 10

⁶⁸ TNA, SP63/373/256–7: Grafton and Galway to Stanhope, 23 Nov. 1715.

⁶⁹ *CJI*, iii, 91; McGrath, ‘Central Aspects’, 15.

⁷⁰ *The Statutes at Large passed in the Parliaments held in Ireland* (21 vols, Dublin, 1765-1804), iv, 315–17.

⁷¹ C.I. McGrath, ‘Parliamentary Additional Supply: The Development and Use of Regular Short-Term Taxation in the Irish Parliament, 1692–1716’, *Parliamentary History*, xx (2001), 27–54.

December.⁷² In the interval, attention in the Commons focused upon the continuing desire for retribution for events in 1711–14, on security legislation against a possible Jacobite invasion or rebellion,⁷³ and in discussing whether or not wholly new additional duties should be voted. The government's main concern was that, since the cost of the establishment was higher than ever before, trying to force the issue on the additional duties might encourage MPs to focus on the reasons for that higher expenditure and, specifically, on the sensitive issue of the pensions paid to absentees.⁷⁴ However, despite opposition from 'some who have the highest obligations' to the king, the Irish chief secretary, Sir Charles Delafaye, did not doubt but that 'we shall carry what we propose, which [is] a duty of [£4] per ton upon all wine and 10*d.* per gallon on brandy'. The arguments against included:

that when once they give a new fund it becomes perpetual; that if our treasury overflows you in England draw away the money by king's letters for bounty and pensions; that of those many are given to undeserving people, to persons that live out of this kingdom, so that the little money we can get, whom you deprive of all means of trading abroad, is drawn off to England.⁷⁵

The main leverage available to the government was the ongoing security concerns. Alongside the heads of bills for the king's security and for attainting

⁷² NAI, Frazer MSS 10 (unfoliated): minute book of the committee of public accounts, 21, 26, 29–30 Nov., 1–2, 4, 6, 8 Dec. 1715; *CJI*, iii, 44, appendix, pp. xi–xxxii.

⁷³ *CJI*, iii, 23–4, 28, 29–30, 32–3, 34–40, 42.

⁷⁴ TNA, SP63/373/252–3, 256–7; McGrath, *Ireland and Empire*, 127–8.

⁷⁵ TNA, SP63/373/296: Delafaye to [Pringle], 6 Dec. 1715.

Ormond and the pretender, drafting commenced on a Militia Bill.⁷⁶ On 6 December, the Commons addressed the lords justices requesting that the government apply to the king for an immediate supply of arms and ammunition for the militia. The government responded that the king had already ordered the sending from England of 10,000 muskets and ammunition. As for the cost, the Commons ordered that it be taken into consideration when the quantum of the supply was decided upon⁷⁷ which, from the government's perspective, 'thereby secured' payment for the arms already requested.⁷⁸

The committee of the whole House on supply sat on 12 December to consider the accounts committee report and resolved that the quantum be £187,587, 12s. 4d.⁷⁹ While discontent was expressed by a few MPs,⁸⁰ the lord justices felt that 'the justice of our demand supported by the good disposition of the Country gentlemen, has carried [the quantum] ... for all that was desired ... and ... there is no room to doubt but the committee of ways and means will readily come into such new funds as together with the additional duties may be in some measure adequate'.⁸¹ The ways and means committee, which sat twice on 15–16 December, resolved that the existing main additional duties be extended for a further 18 months from 21 May 1716 to 21 November 1717, and that a lapsed further additional duty from 1703 be reimposed upon wine, wholly new additional duties be imposed upon strong waters and spirits, a new tax on the salaries, fees, profits of employment and pensions of all absentee

⁷⁶ *CJI*, iii, 12, 32; Garnham, *Militia*, 25–6.

⁷⁷ *CJI*, iii, 38, 41–2, 44.

⁷⁸ TNA, SP63/373/304: Grafton and Galway to Stanhope, 13 Dec. 1715.

⁷⁹ *CJI*, iii, 45–6.

⁸⁰ TNA, SP63/373/302.

⁸¹ TNA, SP63/373/304–5: Grafton and Galway to Stanhope, 13 Dec. 1715.

government officeholders be implemented, and the 6*d.* in the pound payable to the vice-treasurer on all the additional duties be appropriated to the public purse, all for 22 months from 1 February 1716 to 21 November 1717.⁸² Drafting committees were then appointed for two heads of bills: for extending the main additional duties; and for imposing the new duties and taxes. In the latter case, the reason for the duration being two months less than two years was because of the House's desire that both bills would have the same end date in November 1717, while the earliest possible start date which would allow sufficient time for the bill to be drafted, transmitted and returned in accordance with Poyning's Law was deemed to be 1 February 1716. This bill was, therefore, the most urgent. With the Christmas recess pending, the draft heads were presented to the Commons on 20 December and, two days later, were ready to be sent to the lords justices for transmission to London in due form. Almost immediately thereafter, parliament was adjourned until 16 January 1716.⁸³

In the lead up to the two-day sitting of the ways and means committee, concern had been expressed that 'some will endeavour to lay aside the funds that are understood though not yet openly proposed'.⁸⁴ Much to the government's surprise, that opposition arose with the lord chancellor's son, St John Brodrick, who led the attack by focusing on pensions and by endeavouring to get the accounts committee report printed in order to make public the committee's criticisms of such expenditure. The government was able to defeat Brodrick's efforts by 154 votes to 51, which killed off any lingering attempt to oppose the actual supply. Obligated to refocus, 'Brodrick's party' proposed the tax on absentee officials and the appropriation of the vice-

⁸² *CJI*, iii, 50–3.

⁸³ *CJI*, iii, 53–5, 59–60.

⁸⁴ TNA, SP63/373/302: Maxwell to [Stanhope], 13 Dec. 1715.

treasurer's fee, both of which it was known were unpopular in London, though the Irish government claimed that they 'were forced to accept' them.⁸⁵

Overall, the government was happy with the outcome, though it had necessitated serious endeavour. Delafaye complained that the court party had been 'forced to meet every night with the chief of our friends to provide against the next day's battle', while the daytime 'was spent either in the House or in running about to solicit the members and keep our [forces] together whom Brodrick with as much diligence endeavoured to debauch, and had this work lasted but a week longer it would have killed us all'.⁸⁶ It was notable that, by his actions, St John Brodrick sought to make true his father's earlier prophecy of new party divisions emerging in Ireland.

By 24 December, the lords justices were ready to send the Supply Bill to London, at which time they requested that it 'should meet with the greatest dispatch'. They also took the opportunity to remind the British government 'of the danger there may be in making any alterations in this bill on your side, least the same should give a handle to dispute in the ... Commons here, and consequently risk the loss of the whole subsidy'.⁸⁷ In particular, they were concerned about the tax on absentee officials and the appropriation of the vice-treasurer's fees, both of which had been included 'in hopes that it will provoke you in England to alter this bill, and that will give them a pretense for throwing it out when it comes back'. It was a tactic that the Irish whigs under Alan Brodrick had employed in 1703 without success. Now the son was trying to succeed where the father had failed, but the government hoped that he, too, would be disappointed in his aims. Better that 'the pensioners ... lose part of their

⁸⁵ TNA, SP63/373/336-7: Delafaye to [Pringle], 17 Dec. 1715.

⁸⁶ TNA, SP63/373/336-7: Delafaye to [Pringle], 17 Dec. 1715.

⁸⁷ TNA, SP63/373/322-3: Grafton and Galway to Stanhope, 24 Dec. 1715.

income ... than to have the whole bill lost, and consequently the government be unable to pay them anything'.⁸⁸

Continuing rumours of possible alterations to the Supply Bill resulted in Delafaye reporting in early January that the government expected 'new battles' after the recess, 'for our opposers keep together and seem very active and industrious'.⁸⁹ However, the situation altered in the government's favour four days before parliament was due to reconvene, when news of the landing in Scotland of the pretender filtered through to Ireland.⁹⁰ The heightened threat to security that followed prompted a distinct alteration in the mind of MPs, whose wish to manifest their loyalty to the crown ensured greater compliance in providing for the increased financial demands of new and essential military precautions.

In the first instance, on 13 January, the lords justices requested permission from London to raise two extra companies per foot regiment in Ireland, in order to bring the military establishment back to full strength.⁹¹ When parliament reconvened three days later, the readiness of MPs to do what was necessary to provide for the security of the kingdom was immediately evident with a series of unanimous resolutions: for an association to defend and support George I, his government 'and the protestant succession in his royal house, with their lives and fortunes, against the Pretender and all his adherents'; for an address for securing all catholics and others thought to be disaffected to the government; for magistrates to put the laws against catholic priests into execution; and, most importantly in practical terms, for an address

⁸⁸ TNA, SP63/373/324: Delafaye to [Pringle], 24 Dec. 1715. For 1703, see McGrath, 'Alan Brodrick', 70–9; McGrath, *Ireland and Empire*, 84.

⁸⁹ TNA, SP63/374/18: Delafaye to [Pringle], 8 Jan. 1716.

⁹⁰ TNA, SP63/374/22, 26–7.

⁹¹ TNA, SP63/374/26–7.

that ‘whatever forces his majesty shall think fit to raise, or whatever expense ... [he] shall think necessary for the defence of this kingdom, this House shall enable his majesty to make good the same’.⁹² The following day, the government issued printed instructions to local magistrates to muster the militia and to put the laws against catholics into execution.⁹³ At the same time, the association against the rebellion of ‘papists and perjured traitors’, which was to be subscribed to by all MPs, was agreed to. It professed that George I was the ‘rightful and lawful’ king of Great Britain, Ireland and France, and all dominions, and that the subscribers would support the king to the utmost of their power against the pretender and all his adherents.⁹⁴

While the lords justices expressed their satisfaction with the resolutions of the Commons, it was the address desiring the king to take all necessary steps for the security of the kingdom that pleased them most.⁹⁵ Believing themselves ‘in some measure warranted by the address of the ... Commons to go into any necessary expense upon this occasion, though not within the rules prescribed by the Establishment’, they put the half-pay officers and French pensioners on full pay, ordering some to assist with the militia in Dublin and around the country and others to serve with the army, while the dragoon and cavalry regiments were given augmented pay for cantonment at Athlone.⁹⁶ For good measure, Randal MacDonnell, earl of Antrim, the leading catholic noble and perceived focal point for any rising in Ireland,

⁹² *CJI*, iii, 60–1.

⁹³ TNA, SP63/374/47; *CJI*, iii, 63.

⁹⁴ *CJI*, iii, 61.

⁹⁵ TNA, SP63/374/38; *CJI*, iii, 62, 64.

⁹⁶ TNA, SP63/374/42–3: Grafton and Galway to Stanhope, 20 Jan. 1716.

was imprisoned, and permission was sought to arrest other catholic peers such as Richard, Viscount Dillon.⁹⁷

In parliament, the main focus of attention for several days was upon subscribing to the association.⁹⁸ In a related matter, on 21 January the House resolved 85 to 46 that the vice-treasurer, Arthur Annesley, earl of Anglesey, was an enemy of the king and kingdom and should be removed from office because he had been one of the principal advisers to Queen Anne on disbanding the army and proroguing the 1713–14 parliament when a bill to attain the pretender had been under consideration.⁹⁹ The pursuit of Anglesey was more immediately the result of the fact that he had evaded signing the association prior to his departure from Dublin and delegated the task to his proxy, James Hamilton, earl of Abercorn. The attack was led by St John Brodrick and his ‘Cork squadron, to regain their credit by doing something popular and in which they were sure of a majority’. It was also noted that Archbishop Lindsey had delayed signing for three days and had done so with ill grace, placing his name at the very bottom ‘from whence ... [it] might be cut off in [time] convenient’.¹⁰⁰

The Cork squadron’s desire to win back popularity was bound up with the return in late January of the unaltered 22-month Supply Bill.¹⁰¹ The bill passed through the Commons and Lords without any resistance, with the Bill for Attainting the Pretender.¹⁰² The two bills received the royal assent on 28 January from the lords

⁹⁷ TNA, SP63/374/53–4, 57–8.

⁹⁸ *CJI*, iii, 63.

⁹⁹ *CJI*, iii, 66, 67–8.

¹⁰⁰ TNA, SP63/374/57–8: Delafaye to [Pringle], 24 Jan. 1716.

¹⁰¹ TNA, PC2/85, 329, 331–5; SP63/374/53–4, 57–8.

¹⁰² *CJI*, iii, 66, 68, 70–3.

justices, who took the opportunity of being in the parliament building to notify both Houses that letters had arrived from London that morning informing them ‘that there is reason to believe that this kingdom will be very suddenly invaded’. They recommended that parliament ‘take such measures thereupon as may best conduce to the defence and security of your country’. Appealing directly to the Commons, they asked to be facilitated in doing ‘what is further necessary to put the kingdom in a sufficient posture of defence, with the utmost expedition’, promising that whatever ‘expense shall be made at this time, will be so much laid out to preserve the whole’. By way of inducement, the king also sent word that the 12 regiments sent to Britain in 1715 would be paid on the British establishment from the time of their departure from Ireland.¹⁰³

The response from the Commons was immediate and, as pointed out by the government, ‘without precedent’.¹⁰⁴ The House first requested that the lords justices give immediate orders for raising a sufficient number of troops for bringing the establishment up to full strength, and to recruit ‘as many more as they shall think necessary for the further security of the kingdom at this critical juncture’. The Commons also promised to ‘make good whatever money shall be expended on this occasion’, and then passed the all-important resolution that ‘whatever sum or sums of money shall be advanced and paid into the treasury by any person or persons ... for the defence of this kingdom, shall be made good by this House, with legal interest for

¹⁰³ *CJI*, iii, 73–4.

¹⁰⁴ TNA, SP63/374/63–5: Grafton and Galway to Stanhope, 30 Jan. 1716; see also SP63/374/59–60; C.I. McGrath, ‘“The Public Wealth is the Sinew, the Life, of Every Public Measure”: The Creation and Maintenance of a National Debt in Ireland, 1716–45’, in *The Empire of Credit: The Financial Revolution in the British Atlantic World, 1700–1800*, ed. Daniel Carey and Christopher Finlay (Dublin, 2011), 174–5.

the same, out of such aids as shall be granted to his majesty the next session of parliament'.¹⁰⁵ The resolution and ensuing address to that effect constituted the first ever 'vote of credit' by the Irish parliament, and formed the basis for the creation of the national debt.¹⁰⁶ By securing the loan to government upon future parliamentary taxation, the Commons had introduced to Ireland the concept of an interest-bearing funded public debt, which brought into being a whole new level of interdependence between government, parliament and the wider community, in the guise of the public creditors, in a relationship that would serve to shape future political, economic and financial developments in 18th-century Ireland.¹⁰⁷

It remained for the Commons to translate their resolution into a substantive financial instrument to facilitate public borrowing. In this respect, the earlier lack of urgency over the 18-month heads of a Supply Bill was now to prove opportune. The draft heads of that bill had finally been presented to the Commons on 27 January, the day before the vote of credit. Fortuitously, the bill could now be amended to include the necessary financial instrument. A committee of the whole House considered the heads on 1 and 3 February, when a clause was inserted 'for making effectual the vote of credit'. The heads were then sent to the lords justices for transmission to London. The need for MPs to return to their localities as part of the security precautions resulted in parliament adjourning several days later.¹⁰⁸

The government used the borrowed money to raise 13 new regiments in Ireland. Unwilling to take advantage of the fact that the vote of credit was without

¹⁰⁵ *CJI*, iii, 73–5.

¹⁰⁶ TNA, SP63/374/59–60, 63–5; *CJI*, iii, 75–6.

¹⁰⁷ McGrath, *Ireland and Empire*, 181–216; McGrath, 'Public Wealth', 171–207.

¹⁰⁸ *CJI*, iii, 78, 80, 83–5.

limit, the lords justices borrowed only £50,000 for the purpose, which became the principal sum of the new national debt.¹⁰⁹ Recruitment of new soldiers commenced immediately, while the regiments cantoned in Athlone were moved to the centre of the Ormond heartland of Kilkenny because of a belief that the exiled duke would lead the rumoured Jacobite invasion.¹¹⁰ Prior to the February adjournment, the Commons had taken further steps to secure the country, including a request to the privy council to issue proclamations offering £10,000 for the seizure of Ormond if he landed in Ireland and for removing catholics from the army.¹¹¹

Parliament remained in recess until early May, by which time the threat of invasion had receded.¹¹² In the interim, the government transmitted the Supply Bill to London, from whence it was returned without amendment.¹¹³ When parliament reconvened, a small group of ‘malcontents’, numbering about 28, tried to ‘insinuate with the people a jealousy of the government’ by calling for an account ‘of what had been done in pursuance of the former vote of credit’. Although the court party argued that ‘it was pretty odd to call for that so soon’,¹¹⁴ an account of payments made out of the £50,000 was presented to the Commons on 10 May, followed by the Supply Bill. A week later, the bill had passed through all stages in the Commons without difficulty and was sent to the Lords for concurrence, which was forthcoming on 19 May when the bill also received the royal assent.¹¹⁵ In his speech on the delivery of the bill to the

¹⁰⁹ McGrath, *Ireland and Empire*, 182–8; McGrath, ‘Public Wealth’, 174–9.

¹¹⁰ TNA, SP63/374/63–5.

¹¹¹ *CJI*, iii, 74.

¹¹² TNA, SP63/374/103–4; *CJI*, iii, 86; McGrath, *Ireland and Empire*, 128–30.

¹¹³ TNA, SP63/374/169–70, 175–6, 201–3, 205–6, 217–18, 221–2; PC2/85, 352–6, 359–72.

¹¹⁴ TNA, SP63/374/219–20: Delafaye to [Pringle], 4 May 1716.

¹¹⁵ *CJI*, iii, 86, 88–90, appendix, p. xxxviii; TNA, SP63/374/240–1.

lords justices, Speaker Conolly took the opportunity to emphasize once again the unique nature of the ‘unlimited vote of credit’, and the willingness of parliament to pass the Supply Bill ‘before the other bills prepared by the Commons are ready for the royal assent’.¹¹⁶ The growing awareness of the significance of what had occurred was also evident on 6 June, when the Commons took the opportunity to present an address to the king congratulating him on victory over the Jacobite rebels, to point out that ‘notwithstanding the poverty of this kingdom’ they had entrusted the government ‘with an unprecedented and unlimited vote of credit’.¹¹⁷

For the lords justices, the passage of the third and final Supply Bill of the session signalled the successful completion of the government’s parliamentary business. They congratulated themselves on the fact that

Upon the whole considering that the Establishment we brought over, though exceeding any that had gone before it, was allowed without an open complaint, that the parliament have gone into ways and means never made use of before, that upon the first news of the Pretender’s landing in Scotland they trusted us with an unlimited power to borrow money, and raise forces, promising to make good the expense, entering into a very hearty Association, and doing with a great deal of vigour and spirit everything that might show their zeal for his majesty and his government, we hope we shall not be thought to have made an ill sessions of it.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁶ *CJI*, iii, 92–3.

¹¹⁷ *CJI*, iii, 95, 98.

¹¹⁸ TNA, SP63/374/225–6: Grafton and Galway to Stanhope, 17 May 1716.

Parliament continued to sit until 20 June in order to facilitate the passage of other returned bills. The problem of pensions dominated for a time, while the returned Militia Bill was a priority for the Commons. A short-lived flirtation with an idea, previously mooted in 1695 and 1703, of having heads of bills read in both Houses before sending them to the privy council, which originated on this occasion in the Commons, was dropped in the Lords following pressure from the government.¹¹⁹ In no instance, however, did these activities detract from what had gone before. In their closing speech, the lords justices reiterated their own sense of what had been achieved. Informing the Commons that the king had sent his thanks for the supplies ‘so cheerfully granted for his service, and your own defence’, they went on ‘thankfully [to] acknowledge the several marks of confidence you have placed in us, more particularly your seasonable and unprecedented vote of credit, which will remain a memorable proof of your unbounded zeal for his majesty’s service’.¹²⁰

While these sentiments might easily be dismissed as political hyperbole, the repeated emphasis placed upon the significance and unprecedented nature of the vote of credit suggested otherwise. The vote of credit was the central component of a series of important and successful steps taken by government and parliament in Ireland in the period 1714–16 to secure the new Hanoverian regime in the face of internal and external threats. The efforts in parliament to provide for the security of the kingdom in time of need included legislating for the attainder of the pretender, for capturing the exiled duke of Ormond, and for making the militia more useful, as well as the provision of funds to raise 13 new regiments. In the latter instance, the money was

¹¹⁹ TNA, SP63/374/225–6, 229–30, 238–9, 242–3, 244–7, 252–3, 285–6; *CJI*, iii, 106–7, 111–12; Garnham, *Militia*, 24–6; Kelly, *Poyning’s Law*, 200.

¹²⁰ *CJI*, iii, 112.

lent by public creditors whose capital investment and legal interest was secured on the credit of the nation – as represented by parliament – as a debt of the nation, by means of parliamentary legislation. The creation, thereby, of a national debt signalled the introduction into Ireland of a key aspect of the British financial revolution of the late 17th and early 18th centuries. It also demonstrated that financial necessity was the mother of fiscal innovation.¹²¹ More specifically, it made clear that the coalescing of the three imperatives of security, finance, and the army – or Jacobites, money and men – was a powerful combination when it came to focusing the minds of the ruling protestant elite in early-18th-century Ireland.

The creation of a national debt also provided a new dimension to the constitutional relationship between government and parliament which had been evolving since the 1690s. The dictates of that constitutional framework created in the 1690s had developed further during the 1715–16 parliamentary session, while scope for compromise in the face of immediate necessity had prevented unnecessary conflict. Thereafter, until legislative independence in 1782, that constitutional framework served as the basis for government-parliament relations in 18th-century Ireland.¹²²

¹²¹ C.I. McGrath, 'The Irish Experience of "Financial Revolution", 1660–1760', in *Money, Power and Print: Interdisciplinary Studies on the Financial Revolution in the British Isles*, ed. C.I. McGrath and Chris Fauske (Newark, NJ, 2008), 157–88.

¹²² McGrath, *Ireland and Empire*, 167–216; McGrath, 'Central Aspects', 9–34; McGrath, 'Public Wealth', 171–207; C.I. McGrath, 'Money, Politics and Power: The Financial Legislation of the Irish Parliament', in *The Eighteenth-Century Composite State: Representative Institutions in Ireland and Europe, 1689–1800*, ed. D.W. Hayton, James Kelly and John Bergin (Basingstoke, 2010), 21–43.