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## **Off with their heads: Terrorism and electoral support for capital punishment in Australia<sup>\*</sup>**

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**Abstract:** Terrorist attacks such as the attacks on the World Trade Centre in September 2001 have generated new interest in the debate on capital punishment. It has been suggested that support for the death penalty could be higher in the wake of terrorist activity. Using data from the Australian Election Study we investigate voters' attitudes towards capital punishment. Paradoxically, overall support for the death penalty at the 2001 Federal election was lower than at previous elections. In this paper we utilise a treatment effects models to model the determinants of those attitudes and to investigate the impact of terrorism on support for the death penalty at the 2001 Federal election. In particular, we address the question of whether voters who felt terrorism was an important issue had higher levels of support for the death penalty than voters who did not feel that terrorism was important.

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## 1. Introduction

The last person executed in Australia was hanged for murder in 1967. Between 1901 and 1967 only 114 individuals were executed in Australia. Of those only 21 had been executed since 1940. Prior to Federation in 1901, up to 80 individuals were executed each year. The state of New South Wales was the last jurisdiction to maintain the death penalty (for treason and piracy) but abolished capital punishment in totality in 1985. In any event the last person hanged in that state was executed in 1940. The Commonwealth of Australia had abolished capital punishment in its territories in 1973, but no person had ever been executed in either the Northern Territory or the Australian Capital Territory.<sup>1</sup> This type of analysis might suggest that Australians are opposed to capital punishment. That is not the case evidence from opinion polls (McAllister, Mackerras & Brown Boldiston 1997) shows that general public in support. Thus, it appears that Australian political elites are opposed to capital punishment but that the general population are not.

Neither of the major Australian political parties supports the reintroduction of capital punishment. Recently both the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition indicated that they did not support the reintroduction of capital punishment. The Leader of the Opposition went further to argue that he did not support the death penalty in Australia nor for Australians overseas. The recent public interest in the death penalty has been generated by terrorist activity such as the attacks on the World Trade Centre in 2001. There are, at the time of writing, two Australians held at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba awaiting trial. The Australian government has indicated that the US is free to try them but has also made it clear that execution would be unacceptable. In contrast, when the Bali bombers were sentenced to death the Australian government welcomed the decisions and declined to object or protest indicating that the judicial system should be allowed to take its course.

A large part of the literature on capital punishment tends to concentrate on issues relating the deterrence value of capital punishment. This is an empirical issue that has generated substantial controversy. In this paper, however, we are interested in identifying the factors that determine the level of support that an individual has for the

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<sup>1</sup> A brief history of Australian capital punishment can be found in Potas and Walker (1987).

death penalty. In particular, we are interested in investigating whether an individuals' concern about terrorism is related to their level of support for the death penalty.

The Australian Federal Election was held on 10 November 2001. The events of 11 September 2001 had put a spotlight on the threat of global terrorism. There was a perception of an increasing number of illegal immigrants and asylum seekers being smuggled into Australia. In August 2001, the Federal government had used military special forces to prevent a ship carrying Afghan refugees from entering Australian territorial waters. Indeed, both McAllister (2003a; 2003b) and Edwards (2002) argued that the 2001 election was about national security and that the events of 11 September 2001 may have substantially contributed to the electoral outcome that returned the incumbent Federal government. We use survey data concerning the 2001 election to investigate the hypothesis that individuals who stated that terrorism was an important issue had different levels of support for capital punishment compared to those who did not.

The plan of the rest of this paper is as follows. In section 2 we discuss the likely determinants of support for the death penalty. In particular, we hypothesise a potential link between support for the death penalty and concern about terrorism. Section 3 describes the survey data that we use and provides a descriptive analysis of that data. The treatment effects model, which is adopted to model support for the death penalty and concern about terrorism, is outlined in section 4. Finally, section 5 contains some concluding remarks.

## **2. Support for Capital Punishment**

### **2.1 Background**

The level of support for the death penalty that an individual has will be influenced by a number of factors. Pre-eminent in these factors are likely to be the socioeconomic characteristics of the individual. The socioeconomic characteristics that we hypothesise will influence support for the death penalty are income, education, gender and age. For example, high income is likely to be associated with higher support for capital punishment. That is, wealthier individuals feel "threatened" by poorer and low socio-economic individuals and so demand capital punishment as a mechanism to maintain the status quo (Baumer, Messner & Rosenfeld 2003).

Education may also play a role in determining the level of support for the death penalty with high levels of education potentially being associated with lower levels of support for the death penalty. A study by Whitehead and Blankenship (2000) using survey data from Tennessee indicates that gender is another important factor. After controlling for other determinants they find that males are more supportive of capital punishment than females. This gender effect is not uniformly supported. Stack (2000) using GSS data finds no significant gender effect. In terms of an age effect it is not clear whether the relationship is increasing, decreasing or non-linear where older and younger individuals will have lower levels of support for the death penalty.

Other characteristics that have appeared in the literature include race, with whites more likely to support capital punishment than blacks. We suspect this is due to historical and contemporary features of capital punishment in the US.<sup>2</sup> Banner (2002), for example, indicates that those states where slavery was practiced maintained capital punishment for longer and for more crimes than did non-slavery states. In addition, they had differential punishments on the statute books. At present, there is the perception that black defendants are more likely to be executed than white defendants. When examining Australian data, however, we do not expect to observe this relationship. Australia has no history of slavery. The country was initially established as a penal colony and convicted criminals would have done the types of work normally reserved for slaves. Moreover, the racial composition of Australia is, compared to the US, fairly homogenous. Thus we do not consider the impact of ethnic background in this study.

The three monotheistic religions all support capital punishment in their written scriptures but not necessarily in practice. The US evidence indicates that evangelical Protestant Christians tend to support capital punishment whereas Roman Catholics and moderate Christians do not. Jews tend to not support capital punishment. Alarid and Wang (2001) highlight the paradox of Buddhism (probably) being opposed to capital punishment, yet it being common in countries with significant Buddhist

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<sup>2</sup> We also note that this particular racial divide is likely to be US-specific. Most white Americans originate from Europe which generally does not practice capital punishment. In contrast, most black Americans originate from Africa which generally does practice capital punishment.

populations<sup>3</sup>. Thus an individuals' religious affiliation may be related to their level of support for the death penalty.

Political ideology will play a role. Individuals who consider themselves to be more conservative are more likely to support capital punishment than those who consider themselves more liberal or progressive. That is individuals who place themselves at the extreme right are more likely to support capital punishment. Related to this is the potential impact of views on compulsory military service, confidence in the armed forces, views on sentencing in the legal system and membership of charitable organizations.

Our final determinant of support for capital punishment is related to arguments concerning the impact of the crime rate<sup>4</sup>. In particular, the crime rate for those crimes, potentially punishable by capital punishment. Gross and Ellsworth (2001) indicate that we cannot expect a simple direct relationship between the two. Attitudes towards capital punishment are likely to be a function of the perceived homicide rate and, perhaps, the intensity of that perception. Thus a person who kills their estranged spouse may not generate any demand for execution, whereas a mass murderer might. In this context views on terrorism may play a role as the introduction of the death penalty for terrorists has been canvassed as an option. Therefore, we hypothesise that support for capital punishment could be related to the importance that an individual places on the issue of terrorism.

## **2.2 Capital Punishment and Terrorism.**

Whilst it is possible to hypothesise a link between support for capital punishment and an individuals' views on terrorism, it should be recognised that views on the issue of terrorism themselves could be determined by a number of factors. Indeed, in the uncertain climate of late 2001 it is probable that the formation on views on capital punishment and terrorism were jointly determined. In this section we discuss the

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<sup>3</sup> Alarid and Wang (2001) argue that Buddhists may not support the death penalty philosophically but recognise the states right to enforce law and order. Seventeen of the 24 Buddhists in our sample did support capital punishment. This is inconsistent the environmental acceptance argument set out in Alarid and Wang (2001).

<sup>4</sup> Homicide rates do not differ dramatically across regions in Australia and in the context of our (cross section) survey data are unlikely to have an impact.

factors likely to impact upon the importance that an individual places upon the issue of terrorism.

Some of the socioeconomic factors that we suspect influence individuals' views on terrorism are the same as those that we suspect influence individuals' support for the death penalty. These factors are income, education, gender and age. We do not, however, expect religious affiliation to be an important determinant in this case. In addition to socioeconomic characteristics, other likely determinants of individuals' views on terrorism include political ideology and conservatism, confidence in the military, and confidence in the legal system. Whilst confidence in the legal system is also anticipated to play a role in determining the level of support for the death penalty, it will have a different impact on concern about terrorism. Increased confidence in the legal system will lead to greater support for the death penalty, but lower levels of concern about terrorism.

Terrorism is often viewed as a threat to nations and as such we hypothesise that the level of attachment that an individual has to the culture and institutions of the country will influence their concern about terrorism. Jones (1997) investigated issues of national identity in Australia. He introduced and validated three continuous scale variables to represent national identity. These variables relate to Australian nativism (country of birth, long residence and being Christian), affective civic culture (respect for Australian laws and institutions and feeling Australian) and instrumental civic culture (citizenship and English-language competence). He further developed a typology based upon the first two of these variables that Charnock (2001) found significant in determining support for Australia becoming a republic. We hypothesise that the nativism and instrumental civic culture dimensions of national identity, in particular, will impact concern about terrorism. We expect that individuals who score highly on these dimensions will be more concerned about terrorism.

### **3. Data**


#### **3.1 The Australian Electoral Study (AES)**

This paper uses survey data pertaining to the 2001 Federal Election to clarify the impact of various influences upon voter behaviour – “economics or issues”. Our

analysis of the 2001 election is based on the Australian Electoral Study (AES)<sup>5</sup> (Bean, Gow & McAllister 2002).<sup>6</sup> The AES is conducted after every Federal Election and surveying for the 2001 election occurred between 12 November 2001 and 5 April 2002. The sample is drawn from the electoral roll which, given Australia's mandatory voting regime, is kept up-to-date and is reliable. In total there are 2010 cases (individual voters) and 379 variables per case in the final data set.

It should be noted that, unlike the US, Australia does not operate a fixed term electoral cycle. The life of any Federal parliament is three years but, generally, the timing of an election is at the discretion of the Prime Minister. We have data for the 1987, 1990, 1993, 1996, 1998 and 2001 Federal Elections.<sup>7</sup> Although the emphasis in this paper is on the determinants of support for capital punishment as recorded in the 2001 survey, we begin by looking at the levels of support for the death penalty found in the six surveys. Figure One indicates the level of support for the death penalty in Australia.

**Figure 1: Support for the Death Penalty.**



Source: AES 1987, 1990, 1993, 1996, 1998 & 2001.

<sup>5</sup> The originators of the AES data bear no responsibility for our analysis or interpretation of the data.

<sup>6</sup> A full description can be found at <http://asda.anu.edu.au/codebooks/aes2001/title.html>

<sup>7</sup> In 1987 respondents were asked whether they agreed with the statement, 'Bring back the death penalty', whereas in all other years the statement read, 'The death penalty should be reintroduced for murder'.



We have broken up the data by those who “Strongly Agree” and “Agree” with reintroducing the death penalty. We also show a total of the two. Quite clearly over this period a majority of Australians supported the reintroduction of capital punishment. What is of interest is that support for the death penalty has fallen in the 2001 election to 56.5 percent. Our subsequent analysis is based upon the determinants of support for capital punishment in 2001 and, in particular, any relationship between concern about terrorism and support for capital punishment. The 2001 survey is the only one that asked respondents about terrorism. Thus the analysis in this paper cannot address the question why the level of support fell in 2001 relative to that at previous election times.

### **3.2 The 2001 Australian Election Study**

The appendix to this paper details the construction of the variables that represent the factors discussed above. As is typical with survey data most of these variables are discrete in nature. The exceptions are support for the death penalty, family income, and support for compulsory military service. These three variables are being treated as continuous. The other non-discrete variables are own-left right position and the nativism variables, which are all standardised (Z score) variables.<sup>8</sup> We begin by presenting descriptive statistics for these variables in Table 1.

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<sup>8</sup> Standardised variables were constructed on the associated complete non-missing sample and so may not have means of zero and standard deviations of one in the “estimation sample”. That is, missing data is dropped rather than imputed in our analysis.

**Table 1: Descriptive Statistics**

<b>Variable</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Standard Deviation</b>	<b>Minimum</b>	<b>Maximum</b>
Support for the death penalty	3.360	1.396	1	5
Terrorism extremely important issue	0.470	0.499	0	1
Male	0.477	0.500	0	1
Age	45.510	15.087	17	89
Income	5.647	3.142	1	11
Tertiary education	0.253	0.435	0	1
Catholic	0.276	0.447	0	1
Anglican	0.243	0.429	0	1
Uniting	0.081	0.274	0	1
Orthodox	0.031	0.173	0	1
Presbyterian	0.038	0.191	0	1
Other Christian	0.069	0.253	0	1
Other religion	0.041	0.198	0	1
Charity membership	0.231	0.422	0	1
Gun ownership	0.108	0.310	0	1
Support for compulsory military service	2.850	1.284	1	5
Own left-right	-0.047	0.980	-2.677	2.370
Strongly agree law breakers stiffer sentences	0.298	0.457	0	1
Agree law breakers stiffer sentences	0.411	0.492	0	1
Great deal of confidence in legal system	0.046	0.210	0	1
Quite a lot of confidence in legal system	0.323	0.468	0	1
Not very much confidence in legal system	0.523	0.500	0	1
Great deal of confidence in armed forces	0.244	0.430	0	1
Quite a lot of confidence in armed forces	0.609	0.488	0	1
Nativism	-0.121	0.945	-2.045	1.784
Instrumental culture	-0.028	0.987	-4.046	0.869

We see that support for the death penalty is such that the estimation sample appears neutral on its re-introduction. Some 47% of the sample stated that terrorism was an extremely important issue in the election.

## 4. Estimating the Relationships

### 4.1 The Treatments Effects Model

A simple regression model that relates support for the reintroduction of the death penalty for murder by individual  $i$ ,  $y_i$ , to the factors in our model (e.g. gun ownership),  $\mathbf{x}_i$ , is:

$$y_i = \mathbf{x}_i' \mathbf{b} + \delta T_i + u_i, \quad (4.1)$$

where  $T_i$  is the dummy variable indicating whether or not the individual specified that terrorism was an extremely important issue;  $T_i = 1$  if individual  $i$  believed terrorism to be an extremely important issue. The problem lies in correctly estimating  $\delta$ , the coefficient that measures the impact of concern about terrorism on support for the reintroduction of the death penalty. There may be a correlation between an individual's tendency to be concerned about terrorism, and the extent to which they support/oppose the death penalty. For example, an individual who is in favour of the death penalty may also be very concerned about terrorism because they wish the perpetrators of terrorism be brought to justice. This is a problem of self-selection because it depends upon the individual as to whether or not they are extremely concerned about terrorism. This self-selection will result in a biased estimate of  $\delta$  (Greene 2000, pp. 933-934).

A better way to model would be to use a "treatment effects" regression model (Wooldridge 2002). In this model the death penalty equation given in (4.1) above is augmented with a second equation that captures the determination of the factors associated with an individual's concern about terrorism. The second component involves modelling extreme concern about terrorism using a binary Probit formulation. The propensity to be concerned about terrorism,  $T_i^*$ , is given by:

$$T_i^* = \mathbf{z}_i' \mathbf{g} + v_i \quad (4.2)$$

An individual is extremely concerned about terrorism ( $T_i = 1$ ) if  $T_i^*$  is sufficiently large. Thus,

$$T_i = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } T_i^* \geq 0 \\ 0 & \text{if } T_i^* < 0 \end{cases}$$

A key aspect of this model is that the stochastic components in (4.1) and (4.2) will be correlated with correlation equal to  $\mathbf{r}$ . The treatment effects model can be estimated by maximum likelihood (ML) methods under the assumption of joint normality of  $u_i$  and  $v_i$ <sup>9</sup>.

In estimating the model it is hypothesised that support for the death penalty (for murder) may be determined the factors discussed in section 2.1 above and that concern about terrorism is hypothesised to depend upon the factors in section 2.2 above. The next section discusses the results of estimating the model.

## 4.2 Results

We begin by discussing the overall fit of the model in this section. Section 4.3 then discusses selected results on the individual factors found significant in the model and their impacts upon the two outcomes in the model (support for capital punishment and importance of terrorism). Table 2 presents the maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters of the treatment effects model.

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<sup>9</sup> We use Stata, Version 8 to estimate the model by Maximum Likelihood.

**Table 2: The estimated treatment effects model.**

	<b>Coefficient</b>	<b>T-ratio</b>
<b>Death Penalty Equation</b>		
Constant	1.9452	5.66
Male	0.2554	3.40
Age	0.0094	0.77
Age squared	-0.0002	-1.80
Income	0.0003	0.02
Tertiary education	-0.1980	-2.08
Catholic	-0.0309	-0.32
Anglican	0.1604	1.58
Uniting	0.1894	1.37
Orthodox	0.0395	0.20
Presbyterian	0.2010	1.08
Other Christian	-0.0413	-0.29
Other religion	0.2040	1.16
Charity membership	-0.1661	-1.86
Gun ownership	0.2976	2.79
Support for compulsory military service	0.1779	4.95
Own left-right	0.0772	1.73
Strongly agree law breakers stiffer sentences	1.1117	11.63
Agree law breakers stiffer sentences	0.5844	7.00
Great deal of confidence in legal system	-0.4805	-2.34
Quite a lot of confidence in legal system	-0.4011	-3.03
Not very much confidence in legal system	-0.2353	-1.94
Terrorism an extremely important issue	1.2447	4.47
Wald Test	660.41	22 d.f.
<b>Terrorism an extremely important issue (Y/N)-Probit</b>		
Constant	0.0169	0.07
Male	-0.2243	-2.75
Age	0.0032	1.12
Income	-0.0496	-3.49
Tertiary education	-0.2228	-2.13
Charity membership	-0.2160	-2.16
Support for compulsory military service	0.1252	3.53
Own left-right	0.2169	4.80
Great deal of confidence in armed forces	0.2831	2.14
Quite a lot of confidence in armed forces	0.0644	0.57
Great deal of confidence in legal system	-0.5922	-2.40
Quite a lot of confidence in legal system	-0.2753	-1.87
Not very much confidence in legal system	-0.1318	-0.97
Nativism	0.2120	4.47
Instrumental culture	0.1070	2.44
$\rho$	-0.5414	4.56
$\sigma$	1.1752	21.1
Log- Likelihood	-2293.656	
B.I.C.	4866.141	
Sample size	1105	

The model is well determined with reasonable levels of statistical significance associated with the included variables. The variables in the death penalty equation are jointly significant (the Wald test with 22 degrees of freedom being the large sample version of an overall F-test in a least squares regression). Moreover, the probit equation for the importance of terrorism also performs well. Table 3 presents the classification accuracy of this component of the treatment effects model.

**Table 3: Classification Accuracy of the Probit equation for Terrorism**

Actual	Prediction		Total	% Correct
	0	1		
0	411	175	586	70.14
1	185	334	519	64.36
Total	596	509	1105	67.42

The value of the Franes test statistic of 10.709 indicates that the model has significantly better classification accuracy than random assignment (Franses 2000). This shows that the model does well in predicting the importance of terrorism.

*Ceteris paribus*, the estimated model tells us that an individual who views terrorism as an extremely important issue will have a higher level of support for capital punishment. The estimated impact is +1.245 that is equal to an impact of 24.9% ( $=1.245/5$ ). As a final test of the reliability of the estimate of this “treatment effect” we estimated the model in two parts. First we estimated the probit model for importance of terrorism and generated the predicted probabilities. These predicted probabilities were then used in place of the indicator variable for terrorism in a regression model for support for the death penalty. Wooldridge (2002) shows that this gives a robust estimate of the treatment effect. This estimation confirmed the magnitude of the treatment effect<sup>10</sup>.

### 4.3 Discussion

We now turn to discuss the impacts of some of the factors on the level of support for the death penalty and also on the importance of terrorism. Specifically, we will consider the impact of changes in the level of confidence in the legal system, family

<sup>10</sup> Full results available on request.

income and the left-right positioning of an individual on support for the death penalty<sup>11</sup> and the importance of terrorism.

Figure 2 depicts the impact of changing levels of confidence in the legal system. Both the level of support for the death penalty and concern about terrorism fall off with increasing confidence in the legal system. It is predicted that those who have no confidence at all in the legal system are most likely to be concerned about terrorism. Indeed, only those who have no confidence in the legal system are predicted to be extremely concerned about terrorism. Such individuals also have the highest level of support for the death penalty.

**Figure 2: The effect of confidence in the legal system on concern about terrorism and support for the death penalty**




Figure 3 depicts the impact of family income<sup>12</sup>. *Ceteris paribus*, families with incomes below Aus\$30,000 are extremely concerned about terrorism. There is a slight positive relationship between income and support for death penalty, with a large downward movement at about the same income band. Those with incomes below \$30,000 support death penalty and those above oppose it.

<sup>11</sup> Support for the death penalty is represented on a five-point scale where 1 = 'strongly disagree' and 5 = 'strongly agree'.

<sup>12</sup> The income categories are in \$10,000 bands. Income category 1 = less than \$10,000, 2 = \$10,001 to \$20,000... 11 = greater than \$100,000

**Figure 3: The effect of income on concern about terrorism and support for the death penalty.**





Figure 4 presents the relationship between an individual's left-right position and their concern about terrorism and also their level of support for the death penalty. We see that as an individual moves towards the right they are more likely to be concerned about terrorism. Once an individual is "right of centre" they are predicted to be extremely concerned about terrorism. In terms of support for the death penalty, those to the left of this point oppose the death penalty and those at this point or further to the right support death penalty.




**Figure 4: The effect of position on the left-right political spectrum on concern about terrorism and support for the death penalty**




Our final figures, figures 5 and 6, illustrate the predictions of the treatment effects model for stylised individuals. We stylised individuals for each of the political parties and for the whole estimation sample, and then compared model predictions with actual outcomes. Using the stylised Liberal supporter as an example, the observed probability that terrorism is an extremely important issue for this person is equal to the proportion of individuals within the sub-sample of Liberal supporters who believed terrorism was an extremely important issue. For the same stylised individual, the predicted probability was estimated by setting the explanatory factors in the model to the mean values calculated over the sub-sample of Liberal supporters only. The same process was repeated for the remaining parties, with the results shown in Figure 5 below. Figure 6 compares the observed and actual levels of support for the death penalty for stylised individuals.

**Figure 5: Model predictions of concern about terrorism by party.**



**Figure 6: Model predictions of support for the death penalty by party.**



These figures confirm that the model provides a good fit of the data overall – at sample means. They also indicate that the model correctly predicts that Liberal, National and One Nation supporters are extremely concerned about terrorism. The death penalty component of the model does not perform as well as that for importance of terrorism but still performs well.

## 5. Conclusion

In this paper we use survey data concerning the 2001 election to investigate the hypothesis that individuals who stated that terrorism was an important issue had different levels of support for capital punishment than those who did not. The survey data pertain to individuals and their views on a range of issues at the time of the Australian Federal Election of 10 November 2001. At this time, the events of 11 September 2001 had put a spotlight on the threat of global terrorism. Using a treatment effects model we find evidence that, *ceteris paribus*, individuals who thought that terrorism was an extremely important issue had a 24.9% higher level of support for the re-introduction of capital punishment.

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## Appendix: Variable Definitions

This appendix details the definitions of the variables used in the analysis and their relationship with the original 2001 AES variables.

### The dependent variable:

#### **Deathp:**

A five-point scale measuring agreement/disagreement with the statement, ‘the death penalty should be reintroduced for murder’. 1= “strongly disagree”, 5= “strongly disagree”. [E4deathp].

### The treatment variable:

#### **Terror:**

A dummy variable that indicates that terrorism was an extremely important issue in a respondent’s voting decision. 1= “extremely important”; 0= “quite important”, or “not very important”. [D1terror]

### Demographics:

#### **Male:**

This variable indicates gender. 1= male; 0= female. (I1)

#### **Age:**

This variable is the age (in years) of the respondent. (I2)

#### **Agesq:**

Agesq is the square of age.

#### **Income:**

The coding of Income, an 11-value variable that is treated as being continuous, is shown below. It is the response to the question:

“What is the gross annual income, before tax or other deductions, for you and your family living with you from all sources? Please include any pensions and allowances, and income from interest or dividends”.

(I17)

<b>Value</b>	<b>Income Band</b>
<b>1</b>	Less than \$10,000 per year
<b>2</b>	\$10,001 to \$20,000 per year
<b>3</b>	\$20,001 to \$30,000 per year
<b>4</b>	\$30,001 to \$40,000 per year
<b>5</b>	\$40,001 to \$50,000 per year
<b>6</b>	\$50,001 to \$60,000 per year
<b>7</b>	\$60,001 to \$70,000 per year
<b>8</b>	\$70,001 to \$80,000 per year
<b>9</b>	\$80,001 to \$90,000 per year
<b>10</b>	\$90,001 to \$100,000 per year
<b>11</b>	Greater than \$100,000 per year

**Tertiary:**

This variable indicates that the respondent has tertiary qualifications. 1= “Postgraduate degree or Postgraduate diploma”, or “Bachelor degree (including honours”); 0= “No qualifications since leaving school”, “Undergraduate diploma”, “Associate diploma”, “Trade qualification”, or “Non-trade qualification”. (H3)

**Religion dummies:**

A set of dummy variables representing the respondents’ religion was created from the extended religion variable, xi5. The recoding was as follows:

**Cath:**

This variable indicates that the respondent is a member of the Catholic Church. 1= “Catholic-Roman”, or “Catholic-not Roman”; 0= otherwise (with the exception of missing data).

**Anglican:**

This variable indicates that the respondent is a member of the Anglican Church. 1= Church of England; 0= otherwise (with the exclusion of missing data).

**Uniting:**

This variable indicates that the respondent is a member of the Uniting Church. 1= Uniting or Methodist; 0= otherwise (with the exclusion of missing data).

**Orthdx:**

This variable indicates that the respondent is a member of the Orthodox Church. 1= Orthodox; 0= otherwise (with the exclusion of missing data).

**Presby:**

This variable indicates that the respondent is a member of the Presbyterian Church. 1= Presbyterian; 0= otherwise (with the exclusion of missing data).

**Othchrst:**

This variable indicates that the respondent is a member of another Christian Church. 1= Baptist, Brethren, Churches of Christ, Jehovah’s Witness, Latter Day Saints, Lutheran, Salvation Army, Seventh Day Adventist, “Other Protestant”, or “Other Christian”; 0= otherwise (with the exclusion of missing data).

**Othrel:**

This variable indicates that the respondent’s religion is not Christian. 1= Buddhist, Hebrew/Jewish, Muslim, “Other Non-Christian”, Hindu, “Other (Not Specified)”.

**Charity:**

A dummy variable for membership of a charitable organisation: 1= “active member” or “inactive member”; 0= “don’t belong”. (I14P4)

**Gun:**

Indicates that a respondent, or someone in his or her household owns a firearm. 1= yes, 0= no. (I9)

**Political position, political issues and institutions:****Zb10own:**

A standardised variable (Z score) for the respondent's own left-right position on the left-right political spectrum. Low values = left; high values= right. (B10own)

**Ordinary:**

A five-point scale reflecting how well Federal politicians understand ordinary Australians. 1= "Federal politicians don't know what ordinary people think"; 5= "Federal politicians know what ordinary people think". (C10)

**Lawb\_sa:**

A dummy variable for those who strongly agree with the statement, "People who break the law should be given stiffer sentences". 1= "strongly agree"; 0= "agree", "neither agree nor disagree", "disagree", or "strongly disagree". (E4lawbrk)

**Lawb\_a:**

A dummy variable for those who agree with the statement, "People who break the law should be given stiffer sentences". 1= "agree"; 0= "strongly agree", "neither agree nor disagree", "disagree", or "strongly disagree". (E4lawbrk)

**Conscript:**

A variable that reflects agreement with the statement, "Australia should have compulsory military service". 1= strongly disagree; 5= strongly agree. (E4militr)

**Confidence in Australian organisations:****Armed\_g:**

This dummy variable indicates those who have a great deal of confidence in the armed forces. 1= "A great deal of confidence"; 0= "Quite a lot of confidence", "Not very much confidence", or "None at all". (G4P1)

**Armed\_q:**

This dummy variable indicates those who have a quite a lot of confidence in the armed forces. 1= "Quite a lot of confidence"; 0= "A great deal of confidence", "Not very much confidence", or "None at all". (G4P1)

**Legal\_g:**

This dummy variable indicates those who have a great deal of confidence in the legal system. 1= "A great deal of confidence"; 0= "Quite a lot of confidence", "Not very much confidence", or "None at all". (G4P2)

**Legal\_q:**

This dummy variable indicates those who have a quite a lot of confidence in the legal system. 1= “Quite a lot of confidence”; 0= “A great deal of confidence”, “Not very much confidence”, or “None at all”. (G4P2)

**Legal\_nv:**

This dummy variable indicates those who do not have very much confidence in the legal system. 1= “Not very much confidence”; 0= “A great deal of confidence”, “Quite a lot of confidence”, or “None at all”. (G4P2)

**Nativism variables****Znativ1:**

Standardised constructed variable representing ‘nativism’.

nativ = G6P1 (born Australia) + G6P3 (Live Australia) + G6P5 (being Christian)

This variable was standardised and then multiplied by -1 so that low values = not at all important, and high values= very important.

**Zaffcult1:**

Standardised constructed variable representing ‘affective civic culture’.

Affcult = G6P6 (Respect Laws) + G6P7 (Feeling Australian)

This variable was standardised and then multiplied by -1 so that low values = not at all important, and high values= very important.

**Zinstcult1:**

Standardised constructed variable representing ‘instrumental civic culture’.

instcult = G6P2 (Australian citizen) + G6P4 (Speak English)

This variable was standardised and then multiplied by -1 so that low values = not at all important, and high values= very important.