Brazys, SamuelSamuelBrazysHeaney, PeterPeterHeaneyWalsh, Patrick P.Patrick P.Walsh2015-04-212015-04-212015-09Electoral Studieshttp://hdl.handle.net/10197/6504Ethno-regional voting cleavages have featured in a number of sub-Saharan African states during the third wave of democratization. While these voting patterns are well studied, there have been few attempts to understand if pan-ethno-regional coalition building based on targeted economic policies can be employed to secure national electoral coalitions. We examine the 2009 Malawian parliamentary elections where a newly-formed national party used its incumbent position to promote an economic policy based on food security in order to overcome traditional ethno-regional voting patterns. After presenting a formal model of an optimal allocation of an economic resource to induce vote-switching, we use district-level data in a system of equations approach finding that this strategic allocation did indeed contribute to the nation-wide electoral victory.enThis is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Electoral Studies. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Electoral Studies (39, (2015)) DOI: 10.1016/j.electstud.2015.03.007ElectionsAfricaIdentity politicsEthno-regionalClientelismPrebendalismJournal Article39395510.1016/j.electstud.2015.03.0072015-04-12https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ie/