Däubler, ThomasThomasDäublerChristensen, LoveLoveChristensenLinek, LukášLukášLinek2021-08-092021-08-092018 the A2018-10Parliamentary Affairs0031-2290http://hdl.handle.net/10197/12394In this article, we analyse how the degree of parliamentary activity affects both individual MPs’ performance in the candidate selection process within the party and their popularity with voters at the electoral stage. We expect that parliamentary work of MPs matters less for voters’ evaluations of MPs because of limited monitoring capacities and lower salience attached to this type of representation. The empirical analysis uses data from recent elections in the Czech Republic and Sweden. During the analysed period, these countries further personalised their flexible list electoral systems. Our results suggest that parties hold MPs accountable mainly through the threat of non-re-selection rather than by assigning them to a promising list position. While there is no evidence that voters consistently reward MPs’ effort, the case of the Czech elections in 2010 shows that they may do so if context draws attention to individual MPs’ work.enThis is a pre-copyedited, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in Parliamentary Affairs following peer review. The definitive publisher-authenticated version Thomas Däubler, Love Christensen, Lukáš Linek, Parliamentary Activity, Re-Selection and the Personal Vote. Evidence from Flexible-List Systems, Parliamentary Affairs, Volume 71, Issue 4, October 2018, Pages 930–949 is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1093/pa/gsx048.AccountabilityCandidate selectionElectoral reformFlexible-list systemsPersonal voteElectionJournal Article71493094910.1093/pa/gsx0482021-05-20DA1692/1-1GA16-04885Shttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ie/