Walsh, FrankFrankWalsh2016-10-132016-10-132003 Royal2003-07-10Economic Journalhttp://hdl.handle.net/10197/8050Bhaskar and To (1999) develop a model of monopsonistic competition and solve explicitly for equilibrium. While a minimum wage set just above the unconstrained optimum leads firms to increase employment it also causes firm exit as profits fall. In this note I show that the employment and welfare effects of the minimum wage which Bhaskar and To had thought to be ambiguous when firm exit was accounted for are in fact unambiguously positive. The model can be adjusted so that the original ambiguous employment effect results. A decomposition is developed which allows us to calculate the long run employment effect.enThis is the author's version of the following article: Frank Walsh (2003) Comment on 'minimum wages for Ronald McDonald monopsonies: a theory of monopsonistic competition', Economic Journal, 113(489) : 718-722 which has been published in final form at http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-0297.t01-1-00148.MonopsonyMinimum wagesEmploymentJ42J30Journal Article11348971872210.1111/1468-0297.t01-1-001482016-09-19https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ie/