Stout, RowlandRowlandStout2013-11-202013-11-20Chapters ©2008-119780230522022 HB9780230582972 PDFhttp://hdl.handle.net/10197/4960Sally thinks she is being chased by a bear, and runs away. Let us suppose that running away makes sense in the circumstance.1 It seems clear that her reason for running is that a bear is chasing her. But it also seems that her reason for running is that she thinks a bear is chasing her.2 Indeed it is sometimes asserted that her real reason cannot be that a bear is chasing her, but must be merely that she thinks or believes that a bear is chasing her. For example, Michael Smith has argued as follows: Given that an agent who has a motivating reason to φ is in a state that is in this way potentially explanatory of her φ-ing, it is then natural to suppose that her motivating reason is itself psychologically real. … By contrast with normative reasons, then, which seem to be truths … motivating reasons would seem to be psychological states, states that play a certain explanatory role in providing action. (Smith 1994, p. 96)enStout, Rowland, Was Sally's reason for running from the bear that she thought it was chasing her, 2008, Palgrave Macmillan reproduced with permission of Palgrave Macmillan. This extract is taken from the author's original manuscript and has not been edited. The definitive, published, version of record is available here: http://www.palgraveconnect.com/pc/relphil2009/browse/inside/9780230582972.htmlPsychological stateMotivational stateNormative reasonMoral luckBook Chapter10.1057/97802305829722013-10-18https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ie/