Leahy, DermotDermotLeahy2009-12-102009-12-101993-03199306http://hdl.handle.net/10197/1710This paper reexamines the import protection as export promotion thesis in a series of two-stage games in which firms choose R&D and/or capacity in the first stage and quantity or price in the second. It is shown that a tariff affects exports in two ways; firstly, if marginal cost is increasing, by raising home sales directly it crowds out exports; secondly by increasing R&D and/or capacity it raises exports indirectly. Prospects for export enhancing protection are compared for different games and shown to be better in the long run than in the short run.624437 bytesapplication/pdfenF12Foreign trade regulation--Econometric modelsForeign trade promotion--Econometric modelsImport quotas--Econometric modelsOligopoliesWorking Paperhttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/1.0/