Stout, RowlandRowlandStout2020-02-102020-02-102018 Canad2019-06Canadian Journal of Philosophy0045-5091http://hdl.handle.net/10197/11264The judgement that provides the content of intention and coincides with the conclusion of practical reasoning is a normative judgement about what to do, and not, as Anscombe and McDowell argue, a factual judgement about what one is doing. Treating the conclusion of practical reasoning as expressing a recommendation rather than a verdict undermines McDowell’s argument; the special nature of practical reasoning does not preclude its conclusions being normative. Anscombe’s and McDowell’s claim that practical self-knowledge is productive of action may be accommodated by identifying the content of practical knowledge not with the conclusion but with a premise of practical reasoning–a kind of practical reasoning that occurs within rather than before action.enThis is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Canadian Journal of Philosophy on 18 April 2018, available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/00455091.2018.1463839Practical reasoningPractical knowledgeIntention in actionAnscombeMcDowellJournal Article49456457910.1080/00455091.2018.14638392019-11-29https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ie/