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HUNT v ANDERSON: ROUND 16

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ABSTRACT

This paper argues that the philosophical debate in marketing, led by Shelby Hunt and Paul Anderson, is no longer providing new insights and is symptomatic of the anthropocentrism of the social sciences. This anthropocentrism has had consequent implications for metatheoretical frameworks that describe the field and has limited the breadth of philosophical discussion in marketing. The paper argues that this discussion should now move beyond the subject-object debate and it identifies writers who have variously tried to transcend the paradigm. It argues that the debate should move from epistemological to ontological and metaphysical issues and that marketing's philosophical discussion should also be broadened to include debate on aesthetics, theology and technology.

Keywords: marketing, epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy.

... AND IN THE BLUE CORNER ...[1]

For over ten years, Shelby Hunt and Paul Anderson have conducted a debate on the appropriate epistemological and methodological foundations for marketing and consumer research. They are by no means the only protagonists in this long debate which is part of a much larger philosophical discussion throughout the social sciences. It was purely on the basis of output and activity that these two scholars were selected to represent the alternative camps of (critical) realism and (critical) relativism [2].

Using a metaphor of a boxing match to represent the debate provides a way to identify some of the other pertinent actors. One might usefully

identify the referee, seconds, promoters, spectators, sparring partners, and commentators as representations of individuals or groups associated with the debate in marketing. Most marketing academics are spectators, not having gone through the long and arduous training that is needed to become a professional boxer/philosopher. I suggest that most of these spectators are somewhat bemused by the contest and, in discussion with other spectators, are wondering whether the fight has run its course; what is the next fight; and are there other sports and spectacles that might be worth watching. This paper takes a spectator's perspective and is presented as part of this ring-side discussion.

HUNT V ANDERSON: ROUNDS 1 - 15

The argument between Hunt and Anderson can be seen as just one minor skirmish in the long controversy between relativism and realism which can be traced at least as far back as the Sophist-Plato debates. In marketing, there had been a simmering debate about its scientific status during the 1950s and 1960s but the Fall 1983 issue of the *Journal of Marketing* marked the start of this particular episode. It was in this issue that Paul Anderson [3] first criticised Shelby Hunt's previous contributions [4,5] which he labeled as positivist and he advocated an alternative, relativist stance, a position which was supported by a number of other marketing academics writing at this time [6-10]. In 1986, Anderson [11] developed his original work and advocated critical relativist to distance himself from "nihilistic" relativism and solipsism, philosophical positions that Hunt [12] was quick to attack. Critical relativism, as developed by Anderson, accepts the metaphysical notion that there may be a single social and natural reality, but rejects the premise that "there is a single knowable reality waiting 'out there' to be discovered via *the* scientific method" [11, p. 157]. In particular, he points out that "science is a social and historical enterprise, and its knowledge-products can be affected as much by

sociological factors as by purely 'cognitive' or empirical considerations" [11, p. 156].

Meanwhile, Hunt was leading an attack on all forms of relativism, including Anderson's critical relativism [12-15]. Hunt maintains that all forms of relativism are self-refuting and he now, moving away from his previous logical empiricist position, advocates scientific realism [13]. Hunt, while continuing to reject relativism, has genuinely attempted to find some common ground in the debate. In 1991 he argued that the critics of positivism misunderstood positivism as developed by the logical positivists of the 1920s and he used this misunderstanding to anticipate an "emerging consensus" [16, p. 41] in the debate. He now advocates critical pluralism as an approach that scholars should employ in evaluating their own and others' theories and methods. It is clear, however, that Hunt's ecumenicism is limited to methodological pluralism and does not extend to epistemological pluralism which is relativism by another name.

In his most recent work, Hunt [17] presents his understanding of marketing, a view that is strongly influenced by the epistemological beliefs that he has consistently expressed over the last two decades. Meanwhile, Anderson and the other relativists have been relatively quiet, although Hirschman and Holbrook [18] have recently presented yet another continuum setting out alternative epistemologies. Thus, despite appeals for critical pluralism, the debate seems set to continue. The purpose of this paper is to consider where it might go from here.

ROUND 16

The present phase of the debate is a decade old if the Fall 1983 issue of the *Journal of Marketing* marks the start of this particular confrontation. The debate has been particularly valuable to marketing researchers in that it (a) uncovered alternative epistemologies and methodologies, (b) provided

reasoned arguments for and against specific epistemological positions, and (c) dispelled some of the ill-informed rhetoric by clarifying much of the philosophical terminology. However it is appropriate, at this stage, to assess the current state of the debate and its likely future contribution to marketing. In this section I will argue that the debate, as currently constructed, is no longer making a contribution and should therefore be brought to a conclusion.

The debate has been informative and interesting in the past but it has now reached the stage where, with pendulous inevitability, the same old arguments oscillate between the two camps. The skilled protagonists are engaged, not only in arguing and counter-arguing, but anticipating and counter-arguing the counter arguments [16, p. 38]. As well as these exhibitions of shadow boxing, the debate is also characterised by verbal nit-picking between either professional philosophers of science or marketing academics who have the motivation and time to become philosophers of science.

Not only is the debate repetitive but it is also becoming confusing and virtually impenetrable to the majority of marketing academics. There are veritable bucketfuls of isms and ologies. For example, Hunt identifies *six* different brands of realism alone [16, p. 35] and in his truth continuum he identifies and locates *twenty-five* distinct philosophies from academic skepticism to vulgar absolutism [19, p. 100]. Added to the confusion are debates about the exact meaning of particular isms; Hunt [16], for example, exposes commonly-held views about positivism as historically inaccurate. It is therefore hardly surprising that Peter concluded his recent review of the debate with the comment that "philosophically oriented marketing theorists need to further demonstrate the value of their work for practising marketing scientists" [20, p. 72]. This suggests that the debate is primarily symbolic, providing the token philosophical discussion necessary for academic

legitimacy and self-esteem within the social sciences. Peter's apparent weariness is echoed in Hunt's call for rapprochement and critical pluralism and the absence of a significant recent contribution from Anderson. Maybe Astley's insightful comment that "old paradigms fall from grace not because they are wrong but because they are boring" [21, p. 504] might usefully be applied to the current debate in marketing.

FROM METAPHYSICS ...

The historical development of the present debate in marketing is mapped out, albeit simplistically, in Figure 1. This shows four alternative paradigms (in the Kuhnian sense).

Insert Figure 1 about here

The first paradigm, labeled Metaphysics₁, is the metaphysics as developed by the early Greek philosophers who were primarily concerned with metaphysical discussion about the very nature of things. For example, Thales proposed that everything was ultimately made of water, Anaximenes suggested air, and the Eleatics argued that these substances were just materializations of a static plenum of Being. Democritus extended this thesis of the unity of Being to postulate the existence of simple and immutable particles - atoms. Common to each of these metaphysics is the belief that there is no qualitative difference between man, trees and rocks, since they are all constituted of the same building blocks. This belief system, in which existence, thought, and expression coalesce into one, is illustrated in Figure 1 by placing that which is primordial, the World in this case, at the centre of a circle. In this metaphysics, Man [22] is a *secondary* entity whose existence is defined by his consequent relation with the primordial about which he is

shown to orbit. Man only exists because the World exists; he is not qualitatively different from it.

Plato and Aristotle refused to reduce the whole of reality, including man, to a system that knew nothing but moving atoms. In doing so they commenced discourse α - β which formed one strand in the development of the Judaeo-Christian monotheistic belief system shown as Metaphysics₂ in Figure 1. Fundamental to this belief system is the existence of a Supreme Being and this is depicted by placing God in the primordial position at the centre of the circle. In this metaphysics, Man and the World are secondary entities in that their existence is dependent on God, about which they are shown to orbit [23].

God's primordial position came under direct attack from Descartes, who argued for the centrality of the cogito - his own mind. And God was successfully displaced from the epicentre by Man during the Enlightenment in which a belief in science and reason superseded a belief in the metaphysical. Indeed, the hallmark of positivism, as developed by Hume and the Logical Positivists, was its total rejection of metaphysical beliefs and particularly the Judaeo-Christian paradigm. Thus positivism, as part of the Enlightenment, represented a paradigm shift from a theocentric to an anthropocentric paradigm - a shift that is illustrated in Figure 1 by placing Man in the primordial position at the centre of the circle. In this paradigm, as Hume pointed out, Man ascribes to God his own values. God, as a secondary entity, is hence shown in orbit around Man. This philosophical position is labeled positivism to emphasise the original Positivists' strong anti-metaphysical beliefs. In this context, the term also broadly includes realism and empiricism.

... TO EPISTEMOLOGY ...

As metaphysical beliefs were seen as non-scientific, philosophical discussion moved from metaphysics to epistemology. This epistemological discussion is shown in Figure 1 as discourse γ - δ , a debate that is variously labeled as positivism v antipositivism, positivism v naturalism, realism v idealism, realism v relativism, or empiricism v rationalism. In broad terms, the debates are the same in that they are all centred on whether reality exists 'out there' or whether it is the product of one's mind [24]. The distinguishing feature of the debate (and its current version in marketing) is that it is very much a debate about *epistemology* - how we can know the world in which we live. This is in contrast to discourse α - β and β - γ which were, in essence, about *metaphysics*, i.e. the very nature of Being; the nature of the world in which we live. The key question in the Hunt-Anderson discussion is not in what world do we live, but rather how can we find out about the world in which we live?. Both camps have the same view of metaphysics - they both reject it. In this sense they are both part of the grand project of modernity that the Enlightenment launched.

Positivism, as developed during the Enlightenment, rejected metaphysics and emphasised Man's centrality and the scientific method. Those who have subsequently criticised positivism have done so within this overall anthropocentric belief system. I propose that their alternative epistemological positions (shown as belief system δ in Figure 1) are best understood as 'puzzle solving' within the paradigm rather than a 'paradigm shift' as is sometimes proposed. For example, many antipositivists draw on the work of Berger and Luckman [25] and propose a social constructivist alternative [26, p. 274]. Yet the anthropocentrism in social constructivism is evident in Berger and Luckman's original work where they develop their theses by hypothesizing a meeting between a Man Friday and a Robinson Crusoe [25, p. 73]. This hypothetical meeting between two "pure" individuals provides the basis for virtually all of their subsequent theories

[27]. The starting point, the underlying assumption of their theories, is the individual man, on which everything else is consequent. Hence their thesis that ontology is essentially social is self-fulfilling; as Coase has commented in another context: "we are not surprised to see the man produce the rabbit out of the hat if we've just watched him put it in" [28, p. 69]. The skeptical post-modernist position [29] is, I suggest, much more representative of Kuhn's idea of a paradigm shift.

This anthropocentrism is also evident in Burrell and Morgan's influential classification of competing paradigms in the social sciences [30]. Their classification is based on a subject-object dichotomy which mirrors the realism-relativism positions in the Hunt-Anderson debate. However, this dichotomy is a manifestation of an underlying anthropocentric belief system since both extremes necessitate the existence of a subject [29, p. 49]. Furthermore, the classification system, along with much of social science and the Hunt-Anderson debate, conflates ontology and epistemology. In the tradition of the social sciences, metaphysics is replaced by ontology and ontological discussion is limited to the nature of *man's* existence. Burrell and Morgan even reduce this discussion to the single ontological question that is at the heart of the Hunt-Anderson debate - "whether 'reality' is a given 'out there' in the world, or the product of one's mind" [30, p. 1]. Other metaphysical questions about, for example, the existence of a God or Gods are ignored. And what discussion there is on ontology is cursory; in their 300 page book, they allocate only three paragraphs to this discussion and thereafter assume isomorphism between epistemology and ontology. Hence, Burrell and Morgan's framework, which ostensibly classifies different paradigms, itself constitutes the paradigm, on the basis it masks the ontological assumptions on which it is based.

Even Critical Theorists, the self-proclaimed rebels against received wisdoms, seem unable or unwilling to extricate them from their

Enlightenment heritage. In fact, Alvesson and Willmott trace the roots of Critical Theory (CT) directly to the Enlightenment in their introduction to the field:

"By proceeding from an assumption of the possibilities of a more autonomous individual, who, in the tradition of the Enlightenment, in principle can master his or her own destiny in joint operation with peers, CT acts as an intellectual counterforce to the ego administration of modern, advanced industrial society" [31, p. 9].

Clearly disaffected with "ego administration", these authors seem unable to see beyond an alternative that is based on "an autonomous individual ... who ... can master his or her own destiny". Again, "alternative" world views are underpinned by essentially the same anthropocentric beliefs.

The contemporary philosopher Roy Bhaskar recognised this anthropocentrism when he criticised both empiricism and rationalism for committing the fundamental mistake of reducing being to knowledge - the *epistemic fallacy* - and reducing knowledge to being - the *ontic fallacy* [32, p. 37-38, 33, p. 22]. I submit that both camps in the marketing debate have made the mistake of decreeing that "statements about being either just are or may always be parsed as statements about knowledge" [33, p. 6], and, while concentrating on the realist and relativist fallacies, have overlooked the more significant epistemic and ontic fallacies that underlie their discussions. In simpler terms, the debate has equated the ontological question about the nature of the world in which we live with the epistemological question about how we can know this world.

... TO METAPHYSICS₃

The key insight that Bhaskar has contributed to this debate is that he has clarified the need to (a) separate ontological from epistemological discussion, and (b) preface the latter with the former. Ontology must come first. Bhaskar argues for a realist ontology because "any position can be nominated

'realist' which asserts the existence of some disputed kind of entity (universals, material objects, causal laws, numbers, probabilities, propositions, etc.)" [33, p. 5]. According to Bhaskar

"a realist position in the philosophy of (natural) science will consist, first and foremost, of a theory about the nature of being, rather than the knowledge, of the objects investigated by the sciences - to the effect that they endure and operate independently of human activity, and hence of both sense-experience and thought. So realism is immediately opposed to both empiricism and rationalism, wherein being is defined in terms of the human attributes of experience and reason [33, p. 5]."

Having clarified his ontological position, Bhaskar distinguishes between the "*intransitive*, normally knowledge-independent, real objects of scientific knowledge and the *transitive*, socio-historical, processes of the production of the knowledge of such objects" [33, p. 24]. Rejecting any equivalence between thought and things leads Bhaskar to advocate a *realist ontology but a relativist epistemology*. It is worth noting that this transcendental realism is in stark contrast to Burrell and Morgan's argument for congruence between ontological, epistemological and methodological positions.

Richard Rorty provides a similar resolution to the realist-relativist dilemma by rejecting both realism and relativism and instead proposing a pragmatic approach. Rorty provides a strong rebuttal to Hunt's taunt that relativism is self-refuting and "legitimizes" events such as the Holocaust [34]. He argues that antirealist pragmatists (those who do not think that their views correspond to the nature of things) are not transfixed into inaction because

"we must, in practice, privilege our own group, even though there can be no noncircular justification for doing so ... [The pragmatist] can only be criticised for ethnocentrism, not for relativism" [35, p. 29-30].

This pragmatism reflects the earlier work of William James who viewed truth as "what is good for *us* to believe" [35, p. 22] and the work of Robert Pirsig [36,37] who also rejected the subject-object dichotomy.

Hence, writers such as Bhaskar, Rorty and Pirsig offer a way out of the positivism-antipositivism debate - an intellectual black hole, I submit - that has consumed marketing's philosophical debate. Indeed, Zinkhan and Hirschheim [38] have used Bhaskar's work as the basis of their contribution to the debate. And while both Hunt and Bhaskar advocate "scientific realism", this paper submits that these are distinctly different since Bhaskar argues for *epistemic* relativity, something that Hunt has never accepted.

The interesting question that the next section addresses is: "where will this lead us?"

TERRITORY, THEOLOGY, AND TECHNOLOGY.

I have labeled the new belief system in Figure 1 as Metaphysics₃ to emphasise that the discussion should move from issues of epistemology, which have dominated the social sciences to date, to ontological issues, i.e. questions about the nature of the world in which we live. It is hardly likely, however, that this metaphysics will be comparable with either Metaphysics₁ or Metaphysics₂ - rejecting the current version of humanism does not necessitate a nostalgic return to the past. Thus the use of the term metaphysics is probably both confusing and inappropriate.

One alternative to Metaphysics₃ might be post-modernism since the thesis in this paper parallels much of the post-modern school of thought - an explicit attempt to move away from the anthropocentrism and rationality of modernity. But post-modernism has also been hijacked by those espousing an interpretive or constructivist epistemology [18] - an essentially humanist position - and has consequently been attacked by the positivists as being nihilism by another name. Yet again we vanish down the black hole of the realism - relativism debate. Another problem with the movement is that while it provides insightful criticisms of modernity it has failed to provide a more attractive alternative (reminiscent of Churchill's quip that democracy is

the worst system devised by the wit of man, except for all the others). Furthermore, the ubiquitous term has been applied by so many to so much that it is now almost meaningless. The danger is that instead of moving the discussion away from epistemology, post-modernism will merely paralyse us into inaction. This paper seeks to refocus marketing's philosophical discussion - not to stop it. To this end, I have identified three broad areas that deserve "air-time" in the discussion, namely territory, theology, and technology.

Territory

The first territory of import is the space at the centre of our paradigm circle. Who or what should displace Man from the epicentre? What is ontologically primordial? Some environmentalists, for example, replace Man at the epicentre with the Gaia - the living planet - a belief system that is reminiscent of the metaphysics of the early Greek philosophers. In contrast to economics, which has had a considerable debate on environmental issues [39-43], marketing has had very little to contribute to this debate except for the recent interest in marketing ethics [44,45].

The dominant paradigm has also been criticised and, in some instances totally rejected, by various groups including feminists, New Age religions and a spectrum of counter-cultures. Given the plethora of alternative views, and building on Lyotard's emphasis on indeterminacy and dissensus [46] and Derrida's concept of *différance* [47], I suggest that the question mark should be retained in Figure 1 to symbolise that even though the world is ontologically real there is the actuality of epistemic relativism which means there can be no consensus on what is primordial.

A further territorial question is how we should organise our study of this ephemeral and chaotic world. We might usefully learn from the mathematicians who developed the field of topology and employed the

concept of fractals in their study of mathematical chaos. In our study of social and epistemological chaos we too need new cartographic skills to help map out and describe alternative belief systems and the marketing discourse with and within each of these constituencies.

Issues of territory and boundary are particularly pertinent for marketing academics especially as functional boundaries disappear in practice [48]. Marketing in the academy is a social construction that has been partly defined by the debate about the difference between the natural and the social sciences, within which marketing has traditionally located. But the criticisms of the humanist paradigm raise fundamental questions about social science itself bringing other territorial boundaries into play. For example, marketing might be seen as an art rather than a science - either natural or social. This view is supported by Latour's study of science in action [49] and also by Björkegren's comparison of scientific research and the art world [50]. Björkegren also notes how symbolism and expressionism developed as a reaction against realism and naturalism in art - a conflict that parallels the realism - relativism debate in the philosophy of science.

If marketing is seen as an art then the marketing academic's role might consequently change from that of researcher to that of critic, connoisseur and communicator [51] and the marketing academic may increasingly turn to the humanities for role models and comparison [52]. Consequently, marketing research would be evaluated on the basis of its literary and aesthetic value rather than on its functional utility or methodological rigour. This, I suggest, is already happening. Gareth Morgan, for example, in *Images of Organisations* [53] and *Imaginization* [26] presents new way of seeing things - redolent of Seamus Heaney's book of poems titled *Seeing Things* [54].

Theology

Marketing's intestinal discussion on epistemology has eclipsed other, rather obvious, philosophical questions. One such question is "why is there so little theological discussion in marketing?" The answer is probably to do with the tradition, again traceable to the Enlightenment, of separating science and theology and also marketing's positivist heritage which has encouraged scientific rather than theological discourse. But there are a number of reasons why marketing discourse should now transcend this boundary. First, there are vast numbers of people, including scientists, who publicly display theological and religious beliefs despite the attempt of the Postivists to deride metaphysical beliefs. There seems to be no reason why religious beliefs and activities should not be the studied by marketing academics given both their pervasiveness and endurance. Second, I suggest that if we criticise Positivism we should also question the rejection by the Positivists of metaphysics and metaphysical discussion. In marketing, such a discussion is unlikely to be confined to questions about the existence and nature of a Supreme Being. Other areas worthy of study include the sacred and the profane, the status of objects and rituals, and formal and informal religions [55].

Metaphysical discussion is indeed rare in marketing and in the other social sciences. The seeds for one such discussion might be found in the recent formulation by Robert Pirsig of, what he terms, the Metaphysics of Quality [36,37]. Pirsig, rejecting "Subject-Object Metaphysics" presents a hierarchy of "static patterns of value" in which each element is at once supported by and subjugating the lower elements. The elements in his hierarchy fall into four distinct categories viz. Inorganic, Biological, Social, and Intellectual. Pirsig's point of departure is that he reifies the Social and Intellectual into "superorganisms" which are different but similar to bacterium and biological man. He emphasises that the Social and the Intellectual are not merely inventions of 'man', but that they are higher

organisms than biological man. Just as man houses and devours chickens, so Society constructs and devours man; and just as dogs and chickens do not fully comprehend the nature of man, so too are the Social and Intellectual superorganisms beyond man's full comprehension. Both Rationalists and Empiricists may be quick to dismiss Pirsig's work as unscientific (metaphysical) mumbo-jumbo. Yet this does not necessarily imply that marketing academics should do likewise. I suggest that marketing discourse, which is somewhat sterile, can be enlivened by the inclusion of discussion on metaphysics, religion, theology and God.

Technology

A less radical anti-anthropocentric perspective has been taken by a group of contemporary sociologists led by John Law, Bruno Latour and Michel Callon. These writers, drawing on the work of Foucault, have written extensively on the sociology of knowledge [49,56-59]. The aspect of this literature that is interesting for the present discussion is the deliberate questioning of what society is and, particularly, the boundaries between the social and the technical. Provocatively Law asks:

"Sociology may know about class, or about gender. But what does it know about speciesism - the systematic practice of discrimination against other species? And how much does it know or care about machines?" [59, p. 7]

Elsewhere he makes the rather obvious point that

"Purely social relations are found only in the imaginations of sociologists, among baboons, or possibly, just possibly, on nudist beaches; and purely technical relations are found only in the wilder reaches of science fiction" [60, p. 290].

This deliberate conflation of the social and the technical and the questioning of the anthropocentrism of sociology is a constant theme that runs through Law's work and, to a lesser extent, that of Callon and Latour. Indeed, actor-network theory, as developed by Callon, makes no assumption that actors or agents are individual people [61]. Latour follows similar lines in his work,

refusing to make *a priori* distinctions between humans and non-humans. The essence of this approach is encapsulated in some of the titles to his work viz. *Technology is Society made Durable* [62], *Where Are the Missing Masses? The Sociology of a Few Mundane Artifacts* [63].

An important point of departure in this contemporary work on the sociology of knowledge from the earlier work of Berger and Luckman is the central position that is given to physical artifacts. As was pointed out above, Berger and Luckman developed much of their thesis by extrapolating from hypothetical meetings between two persons from entirely different social worlds [25, p. 73], or between a heterosexual man, a heterosexual woman, and a lesbian [25, p. 80]. They further base their thesis on the "massively real" [25, p. 44] nature of one-to-one situations. These situations, and consequently their extension to society, are deliberately devoid of physical, durable resources. In essence, non-human primates could replace the humans and the same theories should apply. Drawing on the work of the above sociologists, I suggest that what makes human society different is the use that it makes of available physical resources in solving the problems of social organisation. An important question in today's world of artificial intelligence is whether a human-human interaction is more real than a human-computer one. Berger and Luckman appear to say that it is; Latour and his colleagues seem to say it is not. In my view, the latter group have done a considerable service to sociology merely by providing this space for technology and physical artifacts in their discussions on power, knowledge and society. One implication of their work is that the concept of exchange, which is at the centre of marketing discourse and is heavily influenced by social exchange theory [64], needs to be reassessed.

MARKETING METAPHYSICS

Marketing's philosophical discussion has been dominated by an inexorable sparring match between Shelby Hunt and Paul Anderson that has followed familiar patterns for such philosophy of science jousts. This paper has argued that both sides to this debate are locked into an anthropocentric world view that is part of our Enlightenment heritage. In my view neither Hunt's realism nor Anderson's relativism provide an adequate metrology for the study of postmodern marketing as represented, for example, by the rock band U2's Zooropa concerts - a confused cocktail of sound, video, nationalism, television, anarchy, religion, art, spectacle, parody, deification, diabolisation, politics, theatre, computers, hysteria, satellites, sex, drugs, and rock and roll. I suggest that if marketing is to provide new insights into such phenomena it should broaden its attendant philosophical discussion from the philosophy of science to aesthetics, metaphysics, technology and theology. These, then, are the arenas that are likely to attract the spectators and commentators of marketing's future philosophical dogfights.

It is through discussion and debate that the new metaphysics will emerge, a discussion that can be enriched by contributions from those who have or had other world views. I feel it is appropriate, therefore, to give the last word to the great metaphysical poet, John Donne. Here he laments the passing of the Aristotelian cosmos and the rise of Newtonian science:

And new Philosophy calls all in doubt
The Element of fire is quite put out,
The Sun is lost, and th'earth, and no man's wit
Can well direct him where to look for it.
And freely men confess that this world's spent,
When in the Planets and the Firmament,
They seek so many new, then they see that this
Is crumbled out again to his Atomies
'Tis all in Pieces, all coherence gone.

Glossary of Terms

Philosophical debate is noted for its wanton use of cabbalistic terminology and this paper is no exception. The following brief glossary of terms is included to help the reader and the discussion. It is hoped that readers will excuse the liberties taken in summarising philosophical schools into a few words. Many of the definitions are taken from the Chambers English dictionary - 7th Ed.; others are taken from the literature, as indicated.

Anthropocentric: Centring the universe in man.

Antipositivism: The doctrine that posits a cleavage in method between the natural and social science, grounded in the differentiation of their subject matter [65, p. 1]. Rejects the utility of a search for laws or underlying regularities in the world of social affairs [30, p. 5].

Classical Realism: The doctrine that the world exists independently of its being perceived [13, p. 9].

Critical Pluralism: The doctrine that we should adopt a tolerant, open posture to new theories and methods but that all methods, theories, and their knowledge claims can (and must) be subjected to critical scrutiny [16, p. 41].

Critical Realism: The doctrine that all knowledge claims must be critically evaluated and tested to determine the extent to which they do, or do not, truly represent or correspond to that world [13, p. 9].

Critical Relativism: A doctrine that there exists no single "scientific method". Instead, disciplinary knowledge claims are viewed as contingent

upon the particular beliefs, values, standards, methods, and cognitive aims of its practitioners [11, p. 156].

Empirical Realism: The doctrine that real objects of scientific investigation are defined in terms of actual or possible experience [33, p. 7].

Empiricism: A philosophical theory of knowledge which views beliefs, or at least some vital classes of beliefs (e.g. Jane is kind), as depending ultimately and necessarily on experience for justification (Jane is seen performing acts of kindness).

Epistemology: The branch of philosophy that deals with the origin, nature and limits of human knowledge.

Fallibilistic Realism: The doctrine that the job of science is to develop genuine knowledge about that world, even though such knowledge will never be known with certainty [13, p. 9].

Gaia: The Earth apprehended as a living entity within the Solar System.

Idealism: The doctrine that in external perceptions the objects immediately known are ideas, that all reality is in its nature psychical. Any system that considers thought or the idea as the ground either of knowledge or existence.

Logical Empiricism: An epistemology which locates the foundation of knowledge in experience and the basis of science in experiment, induction and observation.

Logical Positivism: Argues that the genuine task of philosophy is to clarify the meanings of basic concepts and assertions (especially those of science) - and not to attempt to answer unanswerable questions such as those regarding the nature of ultimate reality or of the Absolute.

Metaphysics: The simplest definition of metaphysics is that it means beyond or above the physical; it is concerned with the super-natural, that which transcends the physical world that we can see and touch. Metaphysics is concerned with the very nature of being.

Naturalism: A world view that rejects the supernatural. The doctrine that the sciences are (actually or ideally) unified in their concordance with positivist principles, based in the last instance on the Humean notion of law [65, p. 1].

Nihilistic Relativism: The view that all knowledge claims are equally valid and there is no basis on which to make judgements among the various contenders [11, p. 156].

Nominalism: The doctrine that general terms have no corresponding reality either in or out of the mind, being mere words.

Ontology: the part of metaphysics which treats of the nature and essence of things. In the social sciences its use is generally limited to the nature and essence of the social world and man's existence.

Paradigm: A world view, a basic set of beliefs or assumptions that govern one's activities and whose truth one takes for granted.

Positivism: The doctrine that rejects faith and revelation as acceptable sources of knowledge. At once worldly, secular, antitheological, antimetaphysical and advocating strict adherence to the testimony of observation and experience. Also seen as an epistemology that is, in essence, based upon the traditional approaches which dominate the natural sciences.

Rationalism: A system of belief regulated by reason, not by authority. A disposition to apply to religious doctrines the same critical methods as to science and history, and to attribute all phenomena to natural rather than miraculous causes. A Rationalist theory of meaning asserts that there are concepts not derived from or correlated with experienced features of the world, such as "cause," "identity," or "perfect circle" and that these concepts are a priori.

Realism: The doctrine that general terms stand for real existences - in opposition to nominalism. It postulates that the world external to individual cognition is a real world made up of hard, tangible and relatively immutable structures [30, p. 4].

Relativism: Relativism views science as constructing various views of reality. It argues that no interpretation of the world can be made independently of human sensations, perceptions, information processing, feelings and actions [20, p. 73-74].

Scientific Realism: According to Hunt it is a mixture of classical realism, fallibilistic realism and critical realism [13, p. 9]. According to Bhaskar it asserts the existence and activity of the objects of scientific enquiry absolutely or relatively independently of the enquiry of which they are the objects or more generally of all human activity [33, p. 5].

Solipsism: The theory that self-existence is the only certainty, absolute egoism - the extreme form of subjective idealism.

Theocentric: Centring the universe in God.

Transcendental Realism: As defined by Bhaskar it is a development of scientific realism that entails the necessity of ontological realism, the actuality of epistemic relativity, and the possibility of judgemental rationality [33, p. 24].

References

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22. The male term "man" will be used throughout this paper to emphasise the dominant position given to males in each of these paradigms.
23. Of course the portrayal of alternative paradigms and discourses in Figure 1 is a major simplification. In particular, Judaeo-Christian beliefs evolved through a complex process of inter-relationships with many belief systems - including the philosophies of the early and later Greeks. The purpose here is to illustrate fundamental *metaphysical* differences between paradigms, i.e. differences about the nature of Being.
24. This is the dichotomy that Burrell and Morgan (Burrell, G. and Morgan, G., *Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis*, London, Heinemann, 1979, p. 1) have posited as central to ontological discussion. Developments on this dichotomy (see, for example, Hirschman, E.C. and Holbrook, M.B., *Postmodern Consumer Research*, London, Sage, 1992.) posit further alternatives such as the social, linguistic, or individual construction of reality, but each of these retain Man's central position.
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FIG. 1 METAPHYSICAL AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL DISCOURSE