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Practical reasoning and practical knowledge
Author(s)
Date Issued
2019-06
Date Available
2020-02-10T09:45:52Z
Abstract
The judgement that provides the content of intention and coincides with the conclusion of practical reasoning is a normative judgement about what to do, and not, as Anscombe and McDowell argue, a factual judgement about what one is doing. Treating the conclusion of practical reasoning as expressing a recommendation rather than a verdict undermines McDowell’s argument; the special nature of practical reasoning does not preclude its conclusions being normative. Anscombe’s and McDowell’s claim that practical self-knowledge is productive of action may be accommodated by identifying the content of practical knowledge not with the conclusion but with a premise of practical reasoning–a kind of practical reasoning that occurs within rather than before action.
Type of Material
Journal Article
Publisher
Taylor & Francis
Journal
Canadian Journal of Philosophy
Volume
49
Issue
4
Start Page
564
End Page
579
Copyright (Published Version)
2018 Canadian Journal of Philosophy
Language
English
Status of Item
Peer reviewed
ISSN
0045-5091
This item is made available under a Creative Commons License
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Name
Practical reasoning and practical knowledge cjp.docx
Size
134.64 KB
Format
Unknown
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e011131c8170f17e485a66cfac9444fb
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