Cost of delay, deadlines and endogenous price leadership

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat 
pastinei_workpap_006.pdf282.2 kBAdobe PDFDownload
Title: Cost of delay, deadlines and endogenous price leadership
Authors: Pastine, Tuvana
Pastine, Ivan
Permanent link:
Date: Nov-2001
Abstract: This Paper analyses endogenous price leadership in a duopolistic market with differentiated products and symmetrically informed firms. We study the effects of deadlines and discounting in a standard endogenous leadership model. We show that there will be occasional changes in the identity of the price leader with any cost of delay or discounting, however small. By analyzing the incentives that induce a firm to take up the leader position we derive positive predictions about which firm will lead most price changes.
Type of material: Working Paper
Publisher: Centre for Economic Policy Research
Copyright (published version): Copyright Ivan Pastine
Keywords: Endogenous timingPrice leadershipWar of attrition
Subject LCSH: Pricing--Mathematical models
Other versions:
Language: en
Status of Item: Not peer reviewed
Appears in Collections:Economics Research Collection

Show full item record

Google ScholarTM


This item is available under the Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Ireland. No item may be reproduced for commercial purposes. For other possible restrictions on use please refer to the publisher's URL where this is made available, or to notes contained in the item itself. Other terms may apply.