International R&D rivalry and industrial strategy without government commitment
|Title:||International R&D rivalry and industrial strategy without government commitment||Authors:||Leahy, Dermot; Neary, J. Peter||Permanent link:||http://hdl.handle.net/10197/1780||Date:||Aug-1995||Online since:||2010-01-15T16:47:47Z||Abstract:||We examine optimal industrial and trade policies in a series of dynamic oligopoly games in which a home and a foreign firm compete in R&D and output. Alternative assumptions about the timing of moves and the ability of agents to commit intertemporally are considered. We show that the home export subsidy, R&D subsidy and welfare are higher when government commitment is credible than in the dynamically consistent equilibrium without commitment. Commitment thus yields welfare gains (though they are small) but so does unanticipated reneging, whereas reneging which is anticipated by firms yields the lowest welfare of all.||Item notes:||A hard copy is available in UCD Library at GEN 330.08 IR/UNI||Type of material:||Working Paper||Publisher:||University College Dublin. School of Economics||Series/Report no.:||UCD Centre for Economic Research Working Paper Series; WP95/12||Keywords:||Research & Development; R&D subsidies; Strategic trade policy; Export subsidies; Commitment; Dynamic consistency||metadata.dc.subject.classification:||F12; L13||Subject LCSH:||Research, Industrial
|Language:||en||Status of Item:||Not peer reviewed|
|Appears in Collections:||Economics Working Papers & Policy Papers|
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