Comment on : Electoral Contests, incumbency advantages, and campaign finance

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Title: Comment on : Electoral Contests, incumbency advantages, and campaign finance
Authors: Pastine, Ivan
Pastine, Tuvana
Permanent link: http://hdl.handle.net/10197/2611
Date: Sep-2009
Abstract: This paper completes Meirowitz (2008) by analyzing the effect of a cap on political campaign spending in an environment where voters have initial preferences over political candidates. The policy implications are starkly different from the previously analyzed case where voters are indifferent between candidates in the absence of campaign spending. We find that a spending cap always favors the a priori popular candidate. This result holds irrespective of whether it is the incumbent or the challenger who is able to more effectively generate and spend contributions.
Funding Details: Not applicable
Type of material: Working Paper
Publisher: University College Dublin. School of Economics
Keywords: Campaign finance reform;Spending limit;Expenditure limit;Incumbency advantage;Clean elections
Subject LCSH: Campaign funds
Political campaigns--Mathematical models
Voting research
Language: en
Status of Item: Not peer reviewed
Appears in Collections:Economics Working Papers & Policy Papers

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