Political campaign spending limits

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Title: Political campaign spending limits
Authors: Pastine, Ivan
Pastine, Tuvana
Permanent link: http://hdl.handle.net/10197/2668
Date: Oct-2010
Abstract: Political campaign spending ceilings are purported to limit the incumbent's ability to exploit his fundraising advantage. If the challenger does not have superior campaign effectiveness, in contrast to conventional wisdom, we show that the incumbent always benefits from a limit as long as he has an initial voter disposition advantage, however small and regardless of the candidates’ relative fundraising ability. If the challenger has higher campaign spending effectiveness, the effect of limits may be non-monotonic. If the incumbent enjoys a mild initial voter disposition advantage, a moderate limit benefits the challenger. Further restricting the limit favours the incumbent. Stricter limits may lead to the unintended consequence of increased expected spending.
Funding Details: Not applicable
Type of material: Working Paper
Publisher: University College Dublin. School of Economics
Keywords: Campaign finance legislationSpending capExpenditure limitIncumbency advantageEfficiency in fundraisingEffectiveness of campaign spendingInitial voter dispositionAll pay auction
Subject LCSH: Campaign funds--Mathematical models
Political campaigns--Law and legislation
Language: en
Status of Item: Not peer reviewed
Appears in Collections:Economics Working Papers & Policy Papers

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