Politician preferences and caps on political lobbying
|Title:||Politician preferences and caps on political lobbying||Authors:||Pastine, Ivan
|Permanent link:||http://hdl.handle.net/10197/700||Date:||Nov-2006||Abstract:||This paper extends Che and Gale (1998) by allowing the incumbent politician to have a preference for the policy position of one of the lobbyists. The effect of a contribution cap is analyzed where two lobbyists contest for a political prize. The cap always helps the lobbyist whose policy position is preferred by the politician no matter whether it is the high-valuation or the low-valuation contestant. In contrast to Che and Gale, once the cap is binding a more restrictive cap always reduces expected aggregate contributions. However, the politician might support the legislation of a barely binding cap. When politician policy preferences perfectly reflect the will of the people, a more restrictive cap is always welfare increasing. When lobbyist’s valuations completely internalize all social costs and benefits, a cap is welfare improving if and only if the politician favors the high-value policy. Even a barely binding cap can have significant welfare consequences.||Type of material:||Working Paper||Publisher:||University College Dublin. School Of Economics||Copyright (published version):||2006 School Of Economics, University College Dublin||Keywords:||All-pay auction;Campaign finance reform;Explicit ceiling||Subject LCSH:||Political campaigns--Mathematical models
Noncooperative games (Mathematics)
|Language:||en||Status of Item:||Not peer reviewed|
|Appears in Collections:||Economics Working Papers & Policy Papers|
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